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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred under Utah R. App. P. 3, and this Court has appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1997) inasmuch as the issues 
presented to this Court on appeal arise from a criminal conviction from a court of record 
which is not a first degree felony or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Did Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on 
counsel's failure to object during the trial? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court 
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). 
ISSUE 2: Did Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on 
cumulative error? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court 
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). 
ISSUE 3: Did Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure of 
counsel to request a psychiatric evaluation of Bhatia? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court 
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). 
ISSUE 4: Did Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel 
entered into stipulations without his client's consent which stipulations went specifically to 
the elements the State had to prove for conviction? 
l 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court 
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). 
ISSUE 5: Did Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel in the manner in 
which counsel prepared for trial? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court 
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). 
ISSUE 6: Did Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel to 
fail to make an opening argument prior to the commencement of Bhatia's case? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court 
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). 
ISSUE 7: Was it plain error to permit witnesses to testify as to legal conclusions? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court 
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). 
ISSUE 8: Did the prosecutor engage in prosecutorial misconduct during 
the trial? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court 
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). 
ISSUE 9: Did the Court err as a matter of law by denying the motion filed by 
Bhatia based on a single criminal episode? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is that the legal conclusions of 
the court are reviewed for correctness without any deference thereto. State v. Brooks. 908 
2 
P.2d 856 (Utah 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW ON APPEAL 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, rules, regulations and cases are 
believed to be the determinative law of this Appeal and are attached in full in the addendum 
hereto: (1) United States Constitution Amendment VI; (2) Utah State Constitution Article 
I, Section 10 and 12; (3) Strickland v. Washington 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
L Jasbir Bhatia (hereinafter "Bhatia") was charged by information with three 
counts of distribution of pornographic material, pursuant to Section 76-10-1204, Utah 
Code Annotated. 
2. A trial was set in this matter before a jury on February 17, 1999. See Trial 
Transcript (hereinafter referred to as "TT"), cover page. 
3. Prior to the trial, various stipulations were entered into including: 
a. that an edited video was representative of the contents of all of the 
videos upon which the charges were based (TT, P. 97, L. 20-21); 
b. that only evidence concerning the three charges based on the sale 
of videos on April 19, 1998 and April 24, 1998 before the Court that 
day would be admissible (TT, P. 6, L. 11-14). 
4. A motion to consolidate other pending cases was made, but denied by the 
Court. TT,P5,L.9-17. 
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5. Bhatia had an interpreter present during the trial. 
6. Following jury selection and some comments by the Court, the prosecutor 
made his opening statement. TT, P. 91-106. 
7. During his opening arguments, the prosecutor told the jury that "unfortunately, 
you have to or get to view three videos. TT. P. 91, L. 16-17. No objection was lodged by 
defense counsel. 
8. Despite the stipulation that the only admissible evidence which would be 
presented to the Court was the events on the dates of the purchases, the prosecutor in 
opening argument told the jury that the witnesses would tell them that prior to these 
incidents, "Bhatia was warned about selling pornographic videos. . . ." TT. P. 93, L. 4-5. 
No objection was lodged. 
9. During opening argument, the prosecutor informed the jury that the videos 
were "obviously pornographic." TT. P. 97, L. 3. No objection was lodged. 
10. When discu ung the edited video which the jury would see, the prosecutor 
informed the jury "that's ten hours of pornography youfd be sitting through and we're not 
sure you could drive home after something like that." TT. P. 97 L. 22 to P. 98 L. 1. No 
objection was lodged. 
11. During his opening argument, the prosecutor stated, "I would like to tell you 
that if s just as simple as the City proving that this stuff makes you stick to your stomach.. 
.." TT. P. 102, L. 15-17. No objection was lodged. 
12. Bhatia's counsel reserved his opening statement to prior to the commencement 
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of the Defense case. TT, P. 106, L. 21 to P. 107, L. 11. 
13. During the trial, Bhatiafs counsel made a motion pursuant to the doctrine of a 
single criminal episode which was denied by the Court. TT, P. 167 L. 23 to P. 168 L. 8. 
14. After the trial was over, the jury was instructed and recessed to deliberate. 
15. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all three counts. TT, P. 225 L. 23 to 
P. 226 L. 8. 
R FACTUAL HISTORY RELEVANT TO APPEAL 
1. Bhatia operates a booth at the Redwood Swap Meet. TT, P. 109, L 4-5. 
2. At the trial, West Valley City Detective Kory Newbold (hereinafter 
"Newbold") testified that some time in or about December, 1997 he was at the Redwood 
Swap Meet checking business licenses. At that time, he believed Bhatia had videos 
which were pornography. Newbold seized 49 videos but no charges were filed. TT, P. 
110 L. 8 through P. 114L.4. 
3. In April, 1998, Newbold was again at the swap meet this time with Detective 
Evans. TT. P. 114L. 5-12. 
4. Newbold observed Evans purchasing some videos from Bhatia. TT. P. 117 
L. 12 to P. 118 L. 8. 
5. Newbold testified that he watched the videos and testified, "Once I viewed 
the tape and felt that the contents was of a pornographic or harmful material, I began an 
investigation . . . . " TT, P. 119, L. 23-25. 
6. Five days following the purchase of the videos at the swap meet, Newbold 
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testified that Evans called Bhatia at his residence in order to arrange to buy more videos. 
TT.P. 120, L. 2-13. 
7. Newbold testified that he and Evans went to Bhatia's residence where 
Newbold remained in a surveillance van. TT. P. 121, L. 5-11. 
8. Evans went into the house and carried a sack out with him the contents of 
which were inspected by Newbold which he found contained three videos, "two of them 
appeared to be pornographic and then the third one, just from viewing it, didn't appear to 
be pornographic." TT. P. 121 L. 15 to P. 122 L. 3. 
9. Newbold testified that he was not able to find a story line in the videos. 
TT.P. 125 L. 11-14. 
10. On direct examination, the Prosecutor asked Newbold, "Okay, now the 
gentleman that youVe referred to as Mr. Jasbir Bhatia, is that-is this Mr. Bhatia seated next 
to me, with the kind of green sweatshirt on?" TT. P. 109, L. 20-22. No objection was 
lodged. 
11. Following Newbold!s testimony, an unidentified individual entered the 
courtroom. Counsel for Bhatia stated, "Your honor, can I have-is there a possibility I can 
have three to five minutes? I need to talk to my client, sorry to do this in the middle of the 
City's case in chief, but apparently there is an issue, a potential witness that's just stepped in 
and may be a witness for the defense. I'm not quite sure what he has to say, if I could have 
just a minute, I don't think there's any-." TT. P. 127 L. 23 to P. 128 L. 5. 
12. At no time did counsel for Bhatia invoke the witness exclusionary rule. 
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13. Detective Chad Evans was called to testify. IT. P. 130. 
14 Evans testified that on April 19, 1998, he was working at the swap meet. 
1 1 1 1 31,1. 8 10. •- . . • ' •= • . 
1 5 E\ ans testified that Bhatia offered to sell him "full version" videos. FI P. 
132, L. 19. 
16 Evans testified that Bhatia took him to the back of his booth and produced two 
- idec»s I T !' in;; , in , r s . 
17. Evans did not have the money to purchase tl-e \uieos hui -laicd that he 
would return,,, which he did and purchased one viact •• b --25. 
1 8 . I " in s a s k e d Bhi'itiii if l ir i i ihli l | ••- .• • l- - * i l , i ' > I T . 
P . 1 3 5 L . 7 - 1 3 . 
19. On or about April 24. 1098, Evans called Bhatia to inquire about purchasing 
moie\ ideos I I I 1381 1 Il , 
20. On direct examination, the prosecutor asked Evans, "Okay. And again, just for 
housekeeping purposes, the Mr. Bhaua and Jessie "hat we've been refemng to is the 
gentleman over here ,,.. the green sweater o? -^lectio*.-%\ as loured, kvansalnrnied 
t h a t i t H a s * . ; • . • . 
21 , Evans went to Bhatia's residence. TT, P, 140 L I -3, - • 
22. Evans purchased three videos from Bhatia ' II" II" I Il 
events which did not occur on either April 19 or April 24, 1998 contrary to the earlier 
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stipulation. TT. P. 148 L. 12 to P. 150 L. 21. No objections were lodged. 
24. After Evans testified, the prosecution rested other than showing the 
jury an edited version of the purchased tapes. TT. P. 151 L. 5-7. 
25. Prior to showing the tape, the prosecutor made several comments: 
a. "I'm not sure exactly how to delicately do that. I've been informed by 
the people that are with me that they'd prefer not to sit through this, 
so they will exit the courtroom." TT, P. 151, Line 12-15; 
b. "I've also been informed by the interpreter that she has some concerns, 
based upon her religion and her culture, that she not be present during 
it." TT,P. 151, L. 17-20. 
26. Following the showing of part of the tapes but not their entirety, Bhatia's 
counsel stipulated that the portion shown to the jury was representative of the entirety of 
the videos. TT. P. 160 L. 9-16. 
27. At the commencement of the defense case, counsel failed to make his reserved 
opening argument. TT. P. 169. 
28. Bhatia was called as witness. TT. P. 169. 
29. On cross examination, the prosecutor stated "let's see. Didn't you sell videos 
in January, 1998? Weren't they pornographic and the officers took your videos?" TT. P. 173 
L. 20-22. No objection was lodged. 
30. On cross examination, when the prosecutor was asking questions faster than 
they could be interpreted, the following exchange occurred: 
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THE COURT: Mr. Stoney, let it be interpreted. I want us to follow the process— 
MR. STONEY: Okay. 
.!..;. ,ne attorney ask the question, y en i interpi et it, 
•U INTERPRETED R iglit. 
!Ht: COURT: H\en if you understand part of it, wait until it's interpreted and answer 
in your native language. 
I > IK ST! 'INF"\ "omul il Innni, 11ms is a sliani I \v understands ("Wi'v wmd ir'iiii saying. 
TT.P. 174 L. 11-22. 
3 1 °^ > cross examination, the prosecutor asked Bhatia concerning F vans calling 
puinograpi^ . i I. ± 7u L. J. 
32. Finally, Bhatia's counsel objected to the use of the term "pornography" by the 
prosecutor, staling that was "Ilk w hole i istie I 
\'\ 1111 ic ("null sustained the objection, instructing the prosecutor to refer to the 
tapes as "vidu " I I V 176 I 8-9. " . : 
34 ^oMiig argument, the prosecutor stated,, " It s kind of interesting IKT^ ma: 
' in d idn ' t (in ' --• v J i c n In • Innk Ih r s tand ' ' I X -1 * > I Innh|ivlinn 
was lodged. ' • • • 
•using, the prosecutor said,. " W e owe a great thanks ^ \< i-aiivuivd, 
lit"' Invn tt »»itMt "cntlrm JIIIII linn fnilLn, iiiiill In ilm) (ipuLiii In mil l u x in o ill Ihi it n 
house of pornography, so w c owe him a thanks for that." TT. P. 214, L. 8-12. 
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36. In closing, Bhatia's counsel stated he was able to stipulate that the video 
was representative because it was unnecessary for the jury to watch ten hours of it." TT. 
P. 216 L. 20-25. 
37. In closing, when reciting the elements the prosecution has to prove, Bhatiafs 
counsel told the jury to disregard the element of "serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value" stating "Disregard No. 3, because we don't know that it does not contain 
and I do not profess that it does and I would be a hypocrite if I said that. . . ." TT. P. 217 
L. 18-21. 
38. After deliberation, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Bhatia received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to object 
during the trial. There was no legitimate trial strategy which supported this failure to object. 
Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on cumulative error. Bhatia believes 
that he was prejudiced in each instance by ineffective counsel but even if he was not 
prejudiced by each individual incident of ineffective assistance of counsel the cumulative 
effect of such conduct deprived him of a fair trial. Bhatia received ineffective assistance 
of counsel for the failure of counsel to request a psychiatric evaluation of Bhatia. The 
evidence was clear that Bhatia was irrational to the point of requesting the Court not set 
hearings on Thursdays for allegedly religious reasons. Bhatia received ineffective assistance 
of counsel when counsel entered into stipulations without his client's consent which 
stipulations went specifically to the elements the State had to prove for conviction. Bhatia 
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was clearly prejudiced by such a stipulation entered into without his consent. Bhatia 
received ineffective assistance of counsel in the manner in which counsel prepared for 
Court room the subject of his testimony was unknown to counsel Bhatia received 
ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel to fail to make an opening argument prior to the 
commencement of Bhatia's case. Counsel's laiiure prejudiced Bhatia by not alerting the jury 
to his defense pi I ::)i t :> its presenta t io i i 
Bhatia believes that plain error was committed when the Court permitted witnesses 
to testify of legal conclusions which were the ultimate issue to be determined b> the trier of 
fin I HhiiitiJi h'liOit llic pmsmi ln i UIIIIMIU.IIIY III.IIIII/ inipiopcr pii ' iudiu.il nuiniienls 
throughout the trial. da believes that it was error to permit the prosecutor to lead 
witnesses thereby suggesting the answer f~ Verifications of Bhatia Bhatia believes the 
episode and in permitting cross examination which was substantially beyond the scope of 
direct examination. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BHATIA RECEIVE D IXEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BASED 
ON COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT DURING THE TRIAL. 
Bhatia received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to 
tt!))Qt i l i inn i1 Ilk1 h i l l I In i l i i inl i i i i l I! in n lM mi. i l ic t ln ' i Ilk liiiiill u u i i l nit i i i i i i i t ted 
plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App, 1.9961. 
n 
Generally speaking, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may not be brought to the 
attention of the Court of Appeals on a direct appeal, usual "unusual... narrow circumstances exist." 
State v. Vessey. 967 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah App. 1998)[citations omitted]. Such unusual 
circumstances exist when "there is new counsel on appeal and there is an adequate trial record" for 
the Court of Appeals to review the allegations. Id The present case fits the unusual narrow 
circumstances exception which should permit this Court to review the ineffective assistance of 
counsel issues on direct appeal. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant "must first show that 
his trial counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." State v. Finlayson. 956 P.2d 283 (Utah App. 1998) citing to State v. Winward. 941 
P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997)(quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668,687-688, 693,104 
S. Ct. 2052, 2052, 2064,2067, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). "Once that is established, defendant must 
show that "there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different absent the 
deficient performance." IcL A "reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." IcL 
Bhatia believes that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure 
to object throughout the proceedings. First, Bhatia believes that counsel's performance fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness with respect to objecting to inadmissible matters throughout 
the course of the trial. Counsel permitted testimony regarding events which were outside the scope 
of the stipulation concerning admissible evidence. TT, P. 93, L 4-5. Counsel permitted the 
prosecutor to make inflammatory comments in opening argument, during the trial and in closing 
argument calculated to influence the juries mind concerning the nature of the evidence which they 
would be presented. TT. P.91 L. 16-17; P. 97 L. 22 to P. 98 L. 1; TT. P. 102, L. 15-17; TT. P. 151 
12 
L. 12-15,17-20. Counsel permitted the prosecutor to continually characterize and refer to the videos 
as "pornography " TT. P. 97 I ^: P 07 L. 22 to P.. 98 I 1; r " ...-_. < .»»,i ^ .. ;V.J .i..ttcd 
\":- ^.NtriiiM:1 -, ,: *; 'ipulated admissibility dates. Yl . P. 110L. 
8 through. P. 1.1.4 I 4 Counsel permitted the prosecute \* -licit legal conclusions from 
pn >seci iti< m * itne >se I I I 11.9.1 23 ,25; I ' 1 21 I 5 1 I 12.2 I , ""i "i n i J I..,a i. 1 per n litted tl i,e 
prosecutor to lead witnesses on direct examination resulting in direct identification of Bhatia, TT. 
P 109 I 20-22 and. P 138 I 2,3 to P. 1.39 I 2 Finall) , Bliatia's counsel permittee ; . . >r 
to be argumentative concerning the right of Bhatia to an interpreter merely because the prosecutor 
was frustrated with the pace of the questioning. r r T B u sed on the foregoing, 
Bhatia clearlj belie\ es that ti ial coi msel's c :)ii( >.: ' •' ' *v. an ' jec t ive standard of 
reasonableness. 
Bhatia believes that he was prejudiced by the failure to object to evidence beyond the stipulation 
date S ^ c s l . ^ - . i ; . une of the elements of the chargea crimen \\:::•• .i.ieni. •.»:. .\-.ng argum-ji.-. .... 
prosecutor used the fact that videos had been confiscated from Bhatia on a date which was outside 
the scope of the stipulation of admissibility to argue proof of intent. T T ™ ? 1 ? 1 1"> 1^ r n"« 
were to determine. W h i l e elicit ing t e s t imony concern ing the u l t imate i ssue is perm.issi.ble 
undc i *..w • • ... • ..*;. .vw.^. . i i *. kiciive, c|uc>uons w h i c h w o u l d m e r e l y al low a 
witness t< i, i ell the ji in what resuh t< >i « ^ h ; \m i i< it nermitted " State \ Tenney. 913 P.2d 750 
v^ Ji App. 1996)(stating that p _ ___ *ng such questions is "plain error" even if no objection 
:
r Wa-vd - \.ll of the foregoing was prcjuuiciai to bnatia and constitutes plain error to the 
1 3 
degree that no objection was lodged. Moreover, the prejudice to Bhatia is sufficiently clear 
that the failure to object throughout the proceedings and the impact thereon must undermine 
the confidence this Court has in the outcome of the proceeding. 
H. BHATIA RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BASED 
ON CUMULATIVE ERROR. 
Bhatia received ineffective assistance of counsel based on cumulative error. The 
standard of review is whether the trial court committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 
5 (Utah App. 1996). Because most of the allegations as set forth herein were not objected 
to at trial, a plain error standard applies. Plain error has three elements which are (1) error; 
(2) obviousness; and (3) prejudice. State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1996). 
Assuming arguendo, that while it is possible that any one single error as set forth herein and 
throughout this brief by itself may not rise to the level error, Bhatia believes that the 
cumulative effect of all of the errors is sufficient that together they must undermine this 
Court's confidence in the verdict. See State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993) and 
State v. Alonzo-Nolasco. 932 P.2d 606 (Utah App. 1997). 
III. BHATIA RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR 
BASED ON THE FAILURE OF COUNSEL TO REQUEST A PSYCHIATRIC 
EVALUATION. 
Bhatia received ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure of counsel to 
request a psychiatric evaluation of Bhatia. The standard of review is whether the trial 
court committed plain error. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). The evidence 
before this Court was the Bhatia clearly did not understand the gravity of the proceeding 
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against him. First, in a pretrial hearing, Bhatia objected to a hearing being set on Thursday 
based on his religious beliefs. TT. P. 2 3 1 , L. 12-23. On direct examination, Bhatia asked 
what the difference was between the United State . .>:. :.;.. ;. . jiui ;:.-. , \< ;. . . . . J 
Kl'iin nf" (lt»i)i i r .pnp^r i i ijnostion concerning whether In; understood something 
concerning what is required under those documents. I": 1 \ i " ' ' L 13-2! Based on nothing 
more than Bhatia's failure to fully and complete!} understand the existence of separate 
f (HHtiliitiotis ((in lln • Sl;ilt nl IH ill .iiiiJ 11 ii 1 Imled SluU: il v i lr II thai lieeuuld mil possibly 
understand the implications of his rights and responsibilities thereunder. It is equally clear 
that his counsel knew or should have known that Bhatia was not in his right mind and sought 
a ps> chiatric e v aluation of Bhatia. • .•. . • • 
IV. BHATIA R E C E I V E D I N E F F E C T I V E A SSI ST A > C E O F COUNSEI \* HEN 
HIS A T T O R N E Y E N T E R E D I N T O s INSULATIONS \* I I HOU I HIS' 
CONSENT W H I C H W E N T SPECIFICALi V T O T H E E L E M E N T S O F THE 
C R I M E S T H E STATE H A D ™ ^ R O V E . 
stipulations without his client's consent which stipulations went specifically to the elements 
the State had to prove for conviction. The standard of review is whether the trial court 
- • i:ucu puii:- .Mate v.Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 ( Ufc til t \ j: >p 1/996). 
Counsel entered into or made three separate stipulations which constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel because they fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. First, 
counsel entered into said stipulations wiim msulting w ith his client An attorne) has no 
right t( ' ' inacts the si ibstantive rights of their r • *" -hout 
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the client's prior consent. Rackham v. Rackham. 230 P.2d 566 (Utah 1951). In each case, 
the stipulations of counsel impacted the substantive rights of Bhatia without there being any 
evidence that Bhatia consented to such stipulations. 
First, counsel stipulated to the relevant period of admissibility. After having done so, 
he failed to require the prosecutor to stand by his stipulation and limit the evidence as 
stipulated. By failing to enforce the stipulation, the prosecutor used inadmissible evidence 
to prove elements of the crime. Second, counsel stipulated to editing the tapes such that they 
would not have to be shown in their entirety. However, the absence of any artistic, 
literary, political or scientific value is specifically one of the elements of the crimes Bhatia 
was charged with which the prosecution had the burden of proving. By stipulating to editing 
the tapes, he precluded the jury from making the determination on that element. Finally, in 
closing argument, Counsel specifically stipulated that the videos lacked any artistic, literary, 
political or scientific value thereby completing eliminating the requirement that the State 
prove that element of the charged offenses. Bhatia believes that entering such stipulations 
clearly fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Bhatia further believes that he was prejudiced by such stipulations. Initially, 
stipulating to limiting the evidence to only evidence concerning the dates of the charged 
events may have been sound trial strategy which would not be ineffective assistance of 
counsel. However, there is no evidence that Bhatia consented to such a stipulation. More 
importantly, once the stipulation was made, the failure to enforce the stipulation resulted in 
prejudice to Bhatia insofar as the State used actions outside the relevant time frame to prove 
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the intent element of the crimes charged. This clearly was prejudicial. The other stipulations 
were also prejudicial insofar as they eliminated the requirement that the state prove all of the 
elements of its case beyond a reasonable doi ibt Bhatia!s com isel's stipulatioi is \ v ei e \ \ ithoi it 
n »n ;iM)t imna, istantive n J ? :t\ well below an objective reasonable standard and 
prejudicial. • ' 
V ( B H A T I A RECEIVED i N E F F E C T I V E ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BASED 
ON THE MANNER WHICH COUNSEL PREPARED FOR TRIAL, 
Bhatia received ineffective assistance of counsel in the manner in which counsel 
prepared for trial. The standard of re\ iew is whether the trial court committed plain error. 
State v. iruiii, l.. i . _... ;..:.. \; ;i .sn) 
"Tneff•• * - ;^i^n f . !, 'institutionally tolerable simply 
because counsel's conduct was intentional instead of merely negligent." State v. Bullock. 
123 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah IVK)) Counsel has an ooligauon to reasonably prepare lor a 
ei it's case, re j.!,ai „ ii\K.a;i„ j \ 
Washixx i^oii. 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court stated when discussing an attorney^ ciufv to 
investigate potential defenses based both on law and fact, "strategic choices made after less 
lllidii luuipleli ifiiestigatitin in iriMin.iMr piui \i\\ I illiu i »U nl 111 mil U'.isiuiiilili' 
professional JM'. laments support the limitations on investigations." 
T-- the present case, Bhatia believes he received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
themanne:: a... .- ,-• . . • >. »•• ' ipecilk all\, uiijiiihit"! t din lit if1 ill 
in the middle of the trial that a defense witness had entered the court room and that he had 
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no idea what the witness would say. TT. P. 127 L. 23 to P. 128 L. 5. Clearly, counsel's own 
admission during trial indicates a failure to adequately prepare for this proceeding. Bhatia 
believes this falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Bhatia believes that counsel's failure to adequately prepare for trial prejudiced him. 
Counsel did not interview all of the potential witnesses. He admitted as much. Based 
thereon, Bhatia believes that counsel's lack of preparation contributed to the overall plethora 
of mistakes which give rise to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
VI. BHATIA RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BASED 
ON COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MAKE AN OPENING ARGUMENT. 
Bhatia received ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel to fail to make an 
opening argument prior to the commencement of Bhatia's case. The standard of review is 
whether the trial court committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 
1996). 
Bhatia's counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
First, he reserved the right to present his opening argument at the conclusion of the State 
resting its case. TT, P. 106 L. 21 to P. 107 L. 11. Then, at the commencement of 
Bhatia's case, he failed to give his opening argument. TT. P. 169. Bhatia does not 
believe this was sound trial strategy. A similar event occurred in State v. Harry. 873 P.2d 
1149 (Utah App. 1994). In that case, counsel claimed that it was an intentional subconscious 
decision made for strategy purposes. Here, there is no such evidence. Rather, the evidence 
is that counsel's conduct simply fell below an objective reasonable standard resulting in his 
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forgetting to give his opening argument. 
In the Harry case, the court concluded that the failure of counsel to give an 
opening statement was not sufficiently prejudicial as to undermine its confidence in the 
verdict. Bhatia believes his case is different. First, he believes that the jury was never 
fully presented his story of the events such that they were put on notice of the defense 
which Bhatia intended to present. Second, he does not believe that the cross examination 
of the witnesses sufficiently informed the jury of his defense. Finally, he believes that 
when coupled with all of the other incidents of conduct below an objective reasonable 
standard, this is just one more example of the cumulative prejudice suffered by him 
sufficient to collectively undermine this Court's confidence in the verdict. 
VII. IT WAS PLAIN ERROR TO PERMIT PROSECUTION WITNESSES TO 
TESTIFY TO LEGAL CONCLUSIONS. 
It was plain error to permit prosecution witnesses to testify as to legal conclusions. 
The standard of review is whether the trial court committed plain error. State v. Irwin, 924 
P.2d5(UtahApp. 1996). 
Bhatia's counsel permitted the prosecutor to elicite legal conclusions from prosecution 
witnesses. TT. P. 119 L. 23-25; P. 121 L. 5 to P. 122 L. 3. Specifically, both Newbold and Evans 
testified that the videos were pornographic. TT. P. 119 L. 23-25; P. 121 L. 5 to P. 122 L. 3. While 
eliciting testimony concerning the ulitimate issue is permissible under Rule 704 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, "questions which would merely allow a witness to tell the jury what 
result to reach are not permitted.'1 State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1996)(stating 
that permitting such questions is "plain error" even if no objection is lodged). 
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In the present case, no objections were lodged. Nonetheless, it was plain error to 
permit the prosecutor to illicite legal conclusions from the prosecution witnesses. Bhatia was 
prejudiced as a result of these errors. Specifically, these witnesses, police officers, told the 
jury what they should conclude were the nature of the videos in question. Such testimony 
is highly prejudicial and should not be elicited by the prosecutor. Bhatia believes that such 
testimony regarding legal conclusions is sufficient to undermine the confidence in the verdict 
rendered. 
VIII. THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, 
The prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during the trial. Generally, no 
objections were lodged as to the claimed conduct. As such, the standard of review is 
whether the trial court committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). 
Bhatia believes that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct sufficient tow 
arrant to an undermining of this Court's confidence in the verdict. Specifically, the 
prosecutor engaged in the following conduct: 
A. Testimony beyond Stipulation Dates. The prosecutor elicitied testimony 
regarding events which were outside the scope of the stipulation concerning admissible evidence. 
TT, P. 93, L 4-5; TT. P. 110 L. 8 through P. 114 L. 4. In State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 
1992), the Court defined the unique role of a prosecuting attorney as adversarial but with a 
compelling obligation to the sovereignty with an obligation not necessarily to win cases, but rather 
to insure that justice shall be done." To that end, when a prosecutor enters into a stipulation 
limiting the admissibility of evidence to the dates of the particular crimes charged, he does not have 
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the unbridled right to then elicite testimony beyond that stipulation date. Moreover, in the present 
case, the prosecutor violated Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence by admitting evidence of 
allegedly prior bad acts to prove the character of Bhatia in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith." IcL Specifically, in closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the fact that tapes had 
been confiscated from Bhatia prior to the dates of the incidents charged proved his intent. Not only 
was this evidence not admissible under Rule 404(b), but it was not evidence which should have been 
before the Court at all based on the stipulation entered into by the prosecutor. Such conduct was 
plain error. 
B. Inflammatory Comments. The prosecutor continually made inflammatory 
comments in opening argument, during the trial and in closing argument calculated to 
influence the juries mind concerning the nature of the evidence which they would be 
presented. TT. P.91 L. 16-17; P. 97 L. 22 to P. 98 L. 1; TT. P. 102, L. 15-17; TT. P. 151 L. 
12-15,17-20. The prosecutor told the jury that the evidence would make them sick. He told 
them they had the unfortunate duty of viewing the videos. In opening arguments, the 
prosecutor has the right to tell the jury what he expects the evidence will be, but not to be 
argumentative in so doing. The continual making of inflammatory statements was 
prejudicial and misconduct. 
C. Characterization of the Videos, The prosecutor continually characterized and 
referred to the videos as "pornography." TT. P. 97 L. 3; P. 97 L. 22 to P. 98 L. 1; P. 173 L. 
20-22. By so doing, he implied to the jury the ultimate conclusion he wanted them to 
reach. Finally, counsel for Bhatia objected and the objection was sustained. However, at 
2 1 
that point the trial was nearly concluded and the prosecutor has been implying to the jury all 
day long that the videos were pornography which was for them to decide. Such improper 
statements are prosecutorial misconduct. 
D. Legal Conclusions. The prosecutor elicited legal conclusions from prosecution 
witnesses. TT. P. 119 L. 23-25; P. 121 L. 5 to P. 122 L. 3. Specifically, the prosecutor had 
both police officers testify as to their legal conclusion that the videos were pornographic. 
As noted above, it is impermissible to elicite such legal conclusions and is contrary to the 
duty of a prosecutor to insure that the administration of justice is done. This is but one more 
cumulative showing of prejudice which should undermine this Court's confidence in the 
verdict. 
E. Leading Witnesses on Direct. The prosecutor lead witnesses on direct 
examination resulting in direct identification of Bhatia. TT. P. 109 L. 20-22 and P. 138 L. 
23 to P. 139 L. 2. Admittedly the trial court has wide discretion to permit leading questions 
and the administration of the case. However, ,fit is essential that judges exercise tight control 
over the use of leading questions . . . to assure that they are used onl after more open ended 
questions have failed to produce responses." State v. Kallin. 877 P.2d 138 (Utah 1994). In 
the present case, the prosecutor was permitted to lead his witnesses into identifying Bhatia 
as the individual who allegedly sold them they videos and was responsible for the crimes 
charged. Such leading was impermissible and prejudicial error. 
F. Argumentative. The prosecutor was argumentative with Bhatia concerning 
the right of Bhatia to an interpreter merely because the prosecutor was frustrated with the 
22 
pace of the questioning. TT. P. 174 L. 11-22. Specifically, in the presence of the jury the 
prosecutor told the Court and the members of the jury that the use of an interpretor was a 
"sham." Such comments evidenced not only the prosecutors frustration but called into 
question the overall credibility of Bhatia to the jury through impermissible argument and 
castigation. Such conduct is prosecutorial misconduct. 
The collective acts of the prosecutor were misconduct which prejudiced Bhatia. Such 
conduct, taken as a whole, should undermine this Court's confidence in the verdict. 
IX. THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DENYING BHATIA'S 
MOTION BASED ON SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE. 
The Court erred as a matter of law by denying the motion filed by Bhatia based on 
a single criminal episode. The standard of review is that the legal conclusions of the Court 
are reviewed for correctness without any deference thereto. State v. Brooks. 908 d 856, 859 
(Utah 1995). 
In the present case, Bhatia filed a motion claiming that the single criminal episode 
precluded the state from charging him with three separate counts as they were all part of the 
same criminal episode. TT. P. 167 L. 23 to P. 168 L. 8. Essentially, the State argued that 
because Bhatia allegedly sold three separate tapes, each sale was a separate chargeable 
offense under §76-1-1204, Utah Code Annotated. The Court denied the motion, agreeing 
with the State. 
A single criminal episode means "all conduct which is closely related in time and is 
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incident to an attempt or accomplishment of a single criminal episode." §76-1-401, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amended). Essentially, when the same act of a defendant is 
punishable in two separate ways, pursuant to the single criminal episode statute, the 
Defendant may be charged with only one count. §78-1-402, Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended). 
Bhatia believes that the single criminal episode statute applied to the charges brought 
against him. In interpreting this statute, the courts have applied the statute when the events 
are closely related in time and to accomplish the same criminal objective. State v. Cornish. 
571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977). In the present case, the evidence was that Bhatia allegedly sold 
three pornographic videos to Office Evans, one on April 19, 1998 and two on April 24, 
1998. 
Assuming arguendo that Bhatia did in fact sell the videos to the Office, the objective 
of such an act was to distribute videos which may have been unlawful. As such, the 
objective to be accomplished on April 19,1998 and April 24,1998 was the same objective 
both days. Additionally, Bhatia believes that they are sufficiently close in time to be 
considered as falling under the single criminal episode statute. However, again assuming 
arguendo, that this Court finds that the nexus of time between April 19 and April 24, 1998 
are not sufficiently close, nonetheless the single criminal episode statute would preclude 
conviction on two counts based on the single sale of two videos on the same day, at the same 
time, to the same person. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of the 
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single criminal episode statute. This Court should overturn Bhatia's convictions based 
thereon. 
CONCLUSION 
Bhatia received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to object 
during the trial. There was no legitimate trial strategy which supported this failure to object. 
Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on cumulative error. Bhatia believes 
that he was prejudiced in each instance by ineffective counsel but even if he was not 
prejudiced by each individual incident of ineffective assistance of counsel the cumulative 
effect of such conduct deprived him of a fair trial. Bhatia received ineffective assistance 
of counsel for the failure of counsel to request a psychiatric evaluation of Bhatia. The 
evidence was clear that Bhatia was irrational to the point of requesting the Court not set 
hearings on Thursdays for allegedly religious reasons. Bhatia received ineffective assistance 
of counsel when counsel entered into stipulations without his client's consent which 
stipulations went specifically to the elements the State had to prove for conviction. Bhatia 
was clearly prejudiced by such a stipulation entered into without his consent. Bhatia 
received ineffective assistance of counsel in the manner in which counsel prepared for 
trial. Counsel even went so far as to acknowledge to the Court that a witness came into the 
Court room the subject of his testimony was unknown to counsel. Bhatia received 
ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel to fail to make an opening argument prior to the 
commencement of Bhatia's case. Counsel's failure prejudiced Bhatia by not alerting the jury 
to his defense prior to its presentation. 
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Bhatia believes that plain error was committed when the Court permitted witnesses 
to testify of legal conclusions which were the ultimate issue to be determined by the trier of 
fact. Bhatia believes the prosecutor continually made improper prejudicial comments 
throughout the trial. Bhatia believes that it was error to permit the prosecutor to lead 
witnesses thereby suggesting the answer to identifications of Bhatia. Bhatia believes the 
Court err as a matter of law by denying the motion filed by Bhatia based on a single criminal 
episode. 
Dated and Signed this J?_ day of April, 2000. 
^JeffreyC. Howe 
FAMILY LAW PRACTICE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Determinative Law of the Appeal 
(1) United States Constitution Amendment VI; 
(2) Utah State Constitution Article I, Section 10 and 12; 
(3) Strickland v. Washington 
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1 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies. All rights reserved. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
Statute text 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided 
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as 
defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine 
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
1 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall 
consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no fewer than 
eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but 
in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict shall be 
unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall 
be waived unless demanded. 
© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies. All rights reserved. 
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STRICKLAND, SUPERINTENDENT, FLORIDA STATE 
PRISON, ET AL. v. WASHINGTON 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
No. 82-1554. Argued January 10, 1984—Decided May 14, 1984 
Respondent pleaded guilty in a Florida trial court to an indictment that 
included three capital murder charges. In the plea colloquy, respondent 
told the trial judge that, although he had committed a string of burglar-
ies, he had no significant prior criminal record and that at the time of his 
criminal spree he was under extreme stress caused by his inability to 
support his family. The trial judge told respondent that he had ua great 
deal of respect for people who are willing to step forward and admit their 
responsibility." In preparing for the sentencing hearing, defense coun-
sel spoke with respondent about his background, but did not seek out 
character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. Counsel's 
decision not to present evidence concerning respondent's character and 
emotional state reflected his judgment that it was advisable to rely on 
the plea colloquy for evidence as to such matters, thus preventing the 
State from cross-examining respondent and from presenting psychiatric 
evidence of its own. Counsel did not request a presentence report be-
cause it would have included respondent's criminal history and thereby 
would have undermined the claim of no significant prior criminal record. 
Finding numerous aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circum-
stance, the trial judge sentenced respondent to death on each of the mur-
der counts. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, and respondent then 
sought collateral relief in state court on the ground, inter alia, that coun-
sel had rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing proceeding in 
several respects, including his failure to request a psychiatric report, to 
investigate and present character witnesses, and to seek a presentence 
report. The trial court denied relief, and the Florida Supreme Court 
affirmed. Respondent then filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal 
District Court advancing numerous grounds for relief, including the 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, 
the District Court denied relief, concluding that although counsel made 
errors in judgment in failing to investigate mitigating evidence further 
than he did, no prejudice to respondent's sentence resulted from any 
such error in judgment. The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed, 
stating that the Sixth Amendment accorded criminal defendants a right 
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to counsel rendering "reasonably effective assistance given the totality of 
the circumstances." After outlining standards for judging whether a 
defense counsel fulfilled the duty to investigate nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances and whether counsel's errors were sufficiently prejudicial 
to justify reversal, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for applica-
tion of the standards. 
Held: 
1. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel, and the benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffec-
tiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result. The same principle applies to a capital 
sentencing proceeding—such as the one provided by Florida law—that is 
sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of 
standards for decision that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable 
to counsel's role at trial. Pp. 684-687. 
2. A convicted defendant's chum that counsel's assistance \va> ><> de-
fective as to require reversal of a conviction or setting aside of a death 
sentence requires that the defendant show, first, that counsel's perform-
ance was deficient and, second, that the deficient performance prejudice! 
the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair truu. Pp. »v»7-6i»i. 
(a) The proper standard for judging attorney performance is tr.at 
of reasonably effective assistance, considering all the circumstance 
When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness ofcnun>«-."-
assistance, the defendant must >ho\v that counsel's representation .v.! 
below an objective standard of reasonableness,. Judical -cn;:in\ f 
counsel's performance must be highly deferential. and a fair assessrr.f.t 
of attorney performance requires that every effort he made to r.imir..^-
the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstance- : 
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from CUIIM . -
perspective at the time. A court must indulge a strong presump:. -. 
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable prof,— 
sional assistance. These standards require no special amplification r. 
order to define counsel's duty to investigate, the duty at :ssue :n :r..s 
case. Pp. 687-691. 
(b) With regard to the required showing of prejudice, the pmr-r 
standard requires the defendant to show that there :s a reasonac.e yr> r-
abiiity that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the resu.: of :r.e 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probao:.::y ..- .i 
probability sufficient :o undermine confidence :n the outcome. A *• -r. 
hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totauity ..f tr.t- •••.---
dence before the judge or jury. Pp. 691-6W. 
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3. A number of practical considerations are important for the applica-
tion of the standards set forth above. The standards do not establish 
mechanical rules; the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the funda-
mental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. A 
court need not first determine whether counsel's performance was defi-
cient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a 
result of the alleged deficiencies. If it is easier to dispose of an in-
effectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that 
course should be followed. The principles governing ineffectiveness 
claims apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal 
or in motions lor a new trial. And m a federal habeas challenge to a 
state criminal judgment, a state court conclusion that counsel rendered 
effective assistance is not a finding of fact binding on the federal court to 
the extent stated by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), but is a mixed question of law 
and fact. Pp. 696-698. 
4. The facts of this case make it clear that counsel's conduct at and 
before respondent's sentencing proceeding cannot be found unreasonable 
under the above standards. They also make it clear that, even assum-
ing counsel's conduct was unreasonable, respondent suffered insufficient 
prejudice to warrant setting aside his death sentence. Pp. 698-700. 
693 F. 2d 1243, reversed. 
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, 
C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., 
joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, post, p. 701. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, 
p. 706. 
Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Assistant Attorney General of 
Florida, argued the cause for petitioners. On the briefs 
were Jim Smith, Attorney General, and Calvin L. Fox, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
Richard E. Shapiro argued the cause for respondent. 
With him on the brief was Joseph H. Rodriguez.* 
*Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States 
by Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Trott, Deputy Solici-
tor General Frey, and Edwin S. Kneedler; for the State of Alabama et al. 
by Mike Greely, Attorney General of Montana, and John H. Maynard, 
Assistant Attorney General, Charles A. Graddick, Attorney General of 
Alabama, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, John Steven 
Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas, John Van de Kamp, Attorney Gen-
eral of California, Duane Woodard, Attorney General of Colorado, Austin 
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to consider the proper standards for 
judging a criminal defendant's contention that the Constitu-
tion requires a conviction or death sentence to be set aside 
because counsel's assistance at the trial or sentencing was 
ineffective. 
I 
A 
During a 10-day period in September 197G, respondent 
planned and committed three groups of crimes, which in-
J. McGuigan, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut, Mictuul J Boner*. 
Attorney General of Georgia, Tan if S. Hong, Attorney General of" Hawaii. 
Jim Jones, Attorney General of Idaho, Linlci/ E Ptarvw. Attorne\ Gen 
eral of Indiana. Robert T Stephan. Attorney General of Kan>a>. >fei« n I. 
Beshear, Attorney General of Kentucky. Will nun J Gu.stt, Jr . Attorne\ 
General of Louisiana. James E Ticrnvif, Attorney General of Maine 
Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland. Francis \ B< >!<>'' 
Attorney General of Mas.sachui>ett>. Frank J A*«//«»/. Attorne} Genera, 
of Michigan, Hubert H Humphrey III. Attorney General "f Minnesota 
William A. Allam. Attorney General o( Mi>M>Mppi. /«>/<» U A^'c-'.f 
Attorney General of Missouri. Paul L Domva^ At tone\ General ; 
Nebraska. Brian McKay, Attorne) General ot Ne\aaa. In »» / K '> >> , 
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eluded three brutal stabbing murders, torture, kidnaping, se-
vere assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and 
theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, respondent 
surrendered to police and voluntarily gave a lengthy state-
ment confessing to the third of the criminal episodes. The 
State of Florida indicted respondent for kidnaping and mur-
der and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to repre-
sent him. 
Counsel actively pursued pretrial motions and discovery. 
He cut his efforts short, however, and he experienced a sense 
of hopelessness about the case, when he learned that, against 
his specific advice, respondent had also confessed to the first 
two murders. By the date set for trial, respondent was sub-
ject to indictment for three counts of first-degree murder and 
multiple counts of robbery, kidnaping for ransom, breaking 
and entering and assault, attempted murder, and conspiracy 
to commit robbery. Respondent waived his right to a jury 
trial, again acting against counsel's advice, and pleaded guilty 
to all charges, including the three capital murder charges. 
In the plea colloquy, respondent told the trial judge that, 
although he had committed a string of burglaries, he had no 
significant prior criminal record and that at the time of his 
criminal spree he was under extreme stress caused by his in-
ability to support his family. App. 50-53. He also stated, 
however, that he accepted responsibility for the crimes. 
E. g., id., at 54, 57. The trial judge told respondent that 
he had "a great deal of respect for people who are willing 
to step forward and admit their responsibility" but that he 
was making no statement at all about his likely sentencing 
decision. Id., at 62. 
Counsel advised respondent to invoke his right under Flor-
ida law to an advisory jury at his capital sentencing hearing. 
Respondent rejected the advice and waived the right. . He 
chose instead to be sentenced by the trial judge without a 
jury recommendation. 
In preparing for the sentencing hearing, counsel spoke 
with respondent about his background. He also spoke on 
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the telephone with respondent's wife and mother, though he 
did not follow up on the one unsuccessful effort to meet with 
them. He did not otherwise seek out character witnesses 
for respondent. App. to Pet. for Cert. A265. Nor did he 
request a psychiatric examination, since his conversations 
with his client gave no indication that respondent had psycho-
logical problems. Id., at A266. 
Counsel decided not to present and hence not to look fur-
ther for evidence concerning respondent's character and emo-
tional state. That decision reflected trial counsel's sense of 
hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of re-
spondent's confessions to the gruesome crimes. See id., at 
A282. It also reflected the judgment that it was advisable 
to rely on the plea colloquy for evidence about respondent's 
background and about his claim of emotional stress: the plea 
colloquy communicated sufficient information about these sub-
jects, and by forgoing the opportunity to present new evi-
dence on these subjects, counsel prevented the State from 
cross-examining respondent on his claim and from putting on 
psychiatric evidence of its own. Id., at A223-A225. 
Counsel also excluded from the sentencing hearing other 
evidence he thought was potentially damaging. He success-
fully moved to exclude respondent's "rap sheet." Id , at 
A227; App. 311. Because he judged that a presentence re-
port might prove more detrimental than helpful, as it would 
have included respondent's criminal history and thereby 
would have undermined the claim of no significant history of 
criminal activity, he did not request that one be prepared. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. A227-A228, A265-A266. 
At the sentencing hearing, counsel's strategy was based 
primarily on the trial judge's remarks at the plea colloquy as 
well as on his reputation as a sentencing judge who thought it 
important for a convicted defendant to own up to his crime. 
Counsel argued that respondent's remorse and acceptance of 
responsibility justified sparing him from the death penalty. 
Id., at A265-A266. Counsel also argued that respondent 
had no history of criminal activity and that respondent com-
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mitted the crimes under extreme mental or emotional dis-
turbance, thus coming within the statutory list of mitigating 
circumstances. He further argued that respondent should 
be spared death because he had surrendered, confessed, and 
offered to testify against a codefendant and because respond-
ent was fundamentally a good person who had briefly gone 
badly wrong in extremely stressful circumstances. The 
State put on evidence and witnesses largely for the purpose 
of describing the details of the crimes. Counsel did not 
cross-examine the medical experts who testified about the 
manner of death r respondent's victims. 
The trial judge found several aggravating circumstances 
with respect to each of the three murders. He found that all 
three murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, 
all involving repeated stabbings. All three murders were 
committed in the course of at least one other dangerous and 
violent felony, and since all involved robbery, the murders 
were for pecuniary gain. All three murders were committed 
to avoid arrest for the accompanying crimes and to hinder 
law enforcement. In the course of one of the murders, 
respondent knowingly subjected numerous persons to a 
grave risk of death by deliberately stabbing and shooting 
the murder victim's sisters-in-law, who sustained severe—in 
one case, ultimately fatal—injuries. 
With respect to mitigating circumstances, the trial judge 
made the same findings for all three capital murders. First, 
although there was no admitted evidence of prior convictions, 
respondent had stated that he had engaged in a course of 
stealing. In any case, even if respondent had no significant 
history of criminal activity, the aggravating circumstances 
"would still clearly far outweigh" that mitigating factor. 
Second, the judge found that, during all three crimes, re-
spondent was not suffering from extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance and could appreciate the criminality of 
his acts. Third, none of the victims was a participant in, 
or consented to, respondent's conduct. Fourth, respondent's 
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participation in the crimes was neither minor nor the result of 
duress or domination by an accomplice. Finally, respond-
ent's age (26) could not be considered a factor in mitigation, 
especially when viewed in light of respondent's planning of 
the crimes and disposition of the proceeds of the various 
accompanying thefts. 
In short, the trial judge found numerous aggravating cir-
cumstances and no (or a single comparatively insignificant) 
mitigating circumstance. With respect to each of the three 
convictions for capital murder, the trial judge concluded: "A 
careful consideration of all matters presented to the court im-
pels the conclusion that there are insufficient mitigating cir-
cumstances . . . to outweigh the aggravating circumstances." 
See Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d HoS, t->t>:>—<><S-4 (Fla. 19TS) 
(quoting trial court findings), cert, denied, 441 l \ S. i»37 
(1979). He therefore sentenced respondent to death on 
each of the three counts of murder and to prison terms for 
the other crimes. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the 
convictions and sentences on direct appeal. 
B 
Respondent subsequently sought collateral relief .n - i^e 
court on numerous grounds, amomr them that counsel r.,id 
rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing: pmceedn j 
Respondent challenged counsel'- assistance in M\ re-pec-
He asserted that counsel was ineffective because he failed '<> 
move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to requ<—* 
a psychiatric report, to investigate and present character 
witnesses, to seek a presentence investigation report. :o vv •-
sent meaningful arguments to the <entencmtr judire. and * . 
investigate the medical examiner's reports- or eross-e\am::v 
the medical experts. In support of the claim, resn«»nde':: 
submitted 14 affidavits from friends, neighbors, and re.atr. — 
stating that they would have testified if asked to <io -.•. H-
also submitted one psychiatric report and <»ne ps\ ch«''.nir.« ,i. 
report stating that respondent, thouirh not under :r.e :r.:i .-
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ence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, was 
"chronically frustrated and depressed because of his eco-
nomic dilemma" at the time of his crimes. App. 7; see also 
id., at 14. 
The trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hear-
ing, finding that the record evidence conclusively showed 
that the ineffectiveness claim was meritless. App. to Pet. 
for Cert. A206-A243. Four of the assertedly prejudicial 
errors required little discussion. First, there were no 
grounds to request a continuance, so there was no error in 
not requesting one when respondent pleaded guilty. Id., at 
A218-A220. Second, failure to request a presentence inves-
tigation was not a serious error because the trial judge had 
discretion not to grant such a request and because any 
presentence investigation would have resulted in admission 
of respondent's "rap sheet" and thus would have undermined 
his assertion of no significant history of criminal activity. 
Id., at A226-A228. Third, the argument and memorandum 
given to the sentencing judge were "admirable" in light of 
the overwhelming aggravating circumstances and absence of 
mitigating circumstances. Id., at A228. Fourth, there was 
no error in failure to examine the medical examiner's reports 
or to cross-examine the medical witnesses testifying on the 
manner of death of respondent's victims, since respondent 
admitted that the victims died in the ways shown by the 
unchallenged medical evidence. Id., at A229. 
The trial court dealt at greater length with the two other 
bases for the ineffectiveness claim. The court pointed out 
that a psychiatric examination of respondent was conducted 
by state order soon after respondent's initial arraignment. 
That report states that there was no indication of major men-
tal illness at the time of the crimes. Moreover, both the 
reports submitted in the collateral proceeding state that, al-
though respondent was "chronically frustrated and depressed 
because of his economic dilemma," he was not under the influ-
ence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. All three 
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reports thus directly undermine the contention made at the 
sentencing hearing that respondent was suffering from ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbance during his crime 
spree. Accordingly, counsel could reasonably decide not to 
seek psychiatric reports; indeed, by relying solely on the plea 
colloquy to support the emotional disturbance contention, 
counsel denied the State an opportunity to rebut his claim 
with psychiatric testimony. In any event, the aggravating 
circumstances were so overwhelming that no substantial 
prejudice resulted from the absence at sentencing of the 
psychiatric evidence offered in the collateral attack. 
The court rejected the challenge to counsel's failure to de-
velop and to present character evidence for much the same 
reasons. The affidavits submitted in the collateral proceed-
ing showed nothing more than that certain persons would 
have testified that respondent was basically a good person 
who was worried about his family's financial problems. Re-
spondent himself had already testified along those lines at the 
plea colloquy. Moreover, respondent's admission of a course 
of stealing rebutted many of the factual allegations in the affi-
davits. For those reasons, and because the sentencing judire 
had stated that the death sentence would be appropriate 
even if respondent had no significant prior criminal history. 
no substantial prejudice resulted from the absence at sen-
tencing of the character evidence offered in the coilatera. 
attack. 
Applying the standard for ineffectiveness claims articu-
lated by the Florida Supreme Court in Knight v. State. oiM 
So. 2d 997 (1981), the trial court concluded that respondent 
had not shown that counsel's assistance reflected any sub-
stantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of com-
petent counsel that was likely to have affected the outcome 
of the sentencing proceeding. The court specifically found: 
"[A]s a matter of law, the record affirmatively demonstrates 
beyond any doubt that even if [counsel] had done eacr. «»f the 
. . . things [that respondent alleged counsel had railed to :<• 
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at the time of sentencing, there is not even the remotest 
chance that the outcome would have been any different. 
The plain fact is that the aggravating circumstances proved 
in this case were completely overwhelming . . . ." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. A230. 
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. 
Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285 (1981). For essentially 
the reasons given by the trial court, the State Supreme Court 
concluded that respondent had failed to make out a prima 
facie case of either "substantial deficiency or possible preju-
dice" and, indeed, had "failed to such a degree that we 
believe, to the point of a moral certainty, that he is entitled 
to no relief . . . ." Id.y at 287. Respondent's claims were 
"shown conclusively to be without merit so as to obviate the 
need for an evidentiary hearing." Id., at 286. 
C 
Respondent next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida. He advanced numerous grounds for relief, 
among them ineffective assistance of counsel ba^ed on the 
same errors, except for the failure to move for a continuance, 
as those he had identified in state court. The District Court 
held an evidentiary hearing to inquire into trial counsel's ef-
forts to investigate and to present mitigating circumstances. 
Respondent offered the affidavits and reports he had submit-
ted in the state collateral proceedings; he also called his trial 
counsel to testify. The State of Florida, over respondent's 
objection, called the trial judge to testify. 
The District Court disputed none of the state court factual 
findings concerning trial counsel's assistance and made find-
ings of its own that are consistent with the state court find-
ings. The account of trial counsel's actions and decisions 
given above reflects the combined findings. On the legal 
issue of ineffectiveness, the District Court concluded that, 
although trial counsel made errors in judgment in failing to 
STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 679 
668 Opinion of the Court 
investigate nonstatutory mitigating evidence further than he 
did, no prejudice to respondent's sentence resulted from any 
such error in judgment. Relying in part on the trial judge's 
testimony but also on the same factors that led the state 
courts to find no prejudice, the District Court concluded that 
"there does not appear to be a likelihood, or even a significant 
possibility," that any errors of trial counsel had affected the 
outcome of the sentencing proceeding. App. to Pet. for 
Cert. A286-A286. The District Court went on to reject all 
of respondent's other grounds for relief, including one not ex-
hausted in state court, which the District Court considered 
because, among other reasons, the State urged its consider-
ation. Id., at A286-A292. The court accordingly denied 
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded with instructions to apply to the particular fact> 
the framework for analyzing ineffectiveness claims that it 
developed in its opinion. b'To F. 2d >>~\) (19X2). The panel 
decision was itself vacated when Unit B of the former Fifth 
Circuit, now the Eleventh Circuit, decided to rehear the 
case en banc. 679 F. 2d 23 <19S2). The full Court of Ap-
peals developed its own framework for analyzing meffeewe 
assistance claims and reversed the judgment uf the Di.-'riet 
Court and remanded the case for new factfinding under 'he 
newly announced standards. b'98 F. 2d 124:] 119.v2 . 
The court noted at the outset that, because respor.den: r.ad 
raised an unexhausted claim at his evidentiary hearing u: *ne 
District Court, the habeas petition might be characterize-: a> 
a mixed petition subject to the rule of Rose v. L nxhi. 4-V) 
U. S. 509 (1982), requiring dismissal of the entire pet::. »n. 
The court held, however, that the exhaustion requirement :> 
"a matter of comity rather than a matter of jurisdiction" -JM 
hence admitted of exceptions. The court airreed with *ne 
District Court that this ca<e came within an exception : • :r.e 
mixed petition rule. 698 F. 2d, at 124<*\ n. 7. 
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Turning to the merits, the Court of Appeals stated that the 
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel accorded 
criminal defendants a right to "counsel reasonably likely to 
render and rendering reasonably effective assistance given 
the totality of the circumstances." Id., at 1250. The court 
remarked in passing that no special standard applies in capi-
tal cases such as the one before it: the punishment that a 
defendant faces is merely one of the circumstances to be 
considered in determining whether counsel was reasonably 
effective. Id., at 1250, n. 12. The court then addressed 
respondent's contention that his trial counsel's assistance 
was not reasonably effective because counsel breached his 
duty to investigate nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. 
The court agreed that the Sixth Amendment imposes on 
counsel a duty to investigate, because reasonably effective 
assistance must be based on professional decisions and in-
formed legal choices can be made only after investigation 
of options. The court observed that counsel's investigatory 
decisions must be assessed in light of the information known 
at the time of the decisions, not in hindsight, and that "[tjhe 
amount of pretrial investigation that is reasonable defies 
precise measurement." Id., at 1251. Nevertheless, putting 
guilty-plea cases to one side, the court attempted to classify 
cases presenting issues concerning the scope of the duty to 
investigate before proceeding to trial. 
If there is only one plausible line of defense, the court 
concluded, counsel must conduct a "reasonably substantial 
investigation" into that line of defense, since there can be 
no strategic choice that renders such an investigation un-
necessary. Id., at 1252. The same duty exists if counsel 
relies at trial on only one line of defense, although others 
are available. In either case, the investigation need not be 
exhaustive. It must include "'an independent examination 
of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved.'" 
Id., at 1253 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 590 F. 2d 103, 104 
(CA5 1979)). The scope of the duty, however, depends 
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on such facts as the strength of the government's case and 
the likelihood that pursuing certain leads may prove more 
harmful than helpful. 693 F. 2d, at 1253, n. 16. 
If there is more than one plausible line of defense, the court 
held, counsel should ideally investigate each line substan-
tially before making a strategic choice about which lines to 
rely on at trial. If counsel conducts such substantial investi-
gations, the strategic choices made as a result "will seldom 
if ever" be found wanting. Because advocacy is an art and 
not a science, and because the adversary system requires 
deference to counsel's informed decisions, strategic choices 
must be respected in these circumstances if they are based 
on professional judgment. Id., at 1254. 
If counsel does not conduct a substantial investigation into 
each of several plausible lines of defense, assistance may 
nonetheless be effective. Counsel may not exclude certain 
lines of defense for other than strategic reasons. /(/.. at 
1257-1258. Limitations of time and money, however, may 
force early strategic choices, often based solely on conversa-
tions with the defendant and a review of the prosecution'.-
evidence. Those strategic choices about which lines of de-
fense to pursue are owed deference commensurate with the 
reasonableness of the professional judgments on which they 
are based. Thus, "when counsel's assumptions are reasonable 
given the totality of the circumstances and when eoun>elV 
strategy represents a reasonable choice based upon those as-
sumptions, counsel need not investigate lines of defense :hat 
he has chosen not to employ at trial." Id., at 1255 «footnote 
omitted). Among the factors relevant to deciding whether 
particular strategic choices are reasonable are the experience 
of the attorney, the inconsistency of unpursued and pursued 
lines of defense, and the potential for prejudice from taking 
an unpursued line of defense. Id., at 1256-1257, n. 23. 
Having outlined the standards forjudging whether defense 
counsel fulfilled the duty to investigate, the Court of Appeals 
turned its attention to the question of the prejudice to the 
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defense that must be shown before counsel's errors justify 
reversal of the judgment. The court observed that only in 
cases of outright denial of counsel, of affirmative government 
interference in the representation process, or of inherently 
prejudicial conflicts of interest had this Court said that no 
special showing of prejudice need be made. Id., at 1258-
1259. For cases of deficient performance by counsel, where 
the government is not directly responsible for the deficiencies 
and where evidence of deficiency may be more accessible to 
the defendant than to the prosecution, the defendant must 
show that counsel's errors "resulted in actual and substantial 
disadvantage to the course of his defense." Id., at 1262. 
This standard, the Court of Appeals reasoned, is compatible 
with the "cause and prejudice" standard for overcoming 
procedural defaults in federal collateral proceedings and 
discourages insubstantial claims by requiring more than a 
showing, which could virtually always be made, of some con-
ceivable adverse effect on the defense from counsel's errors. 
The specified showing of prejudice would result in reversal of 
the judgment, the court concluded, unless the prosecution 
showed that the constitutionally deficient performance was, 
in light of all the evidence, harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id., at 1260-1262. 
The Court of Appeals thus laid down the tests to be applied 
in the Eleventh Circuit in challenges to convictions on the 
ground of ineffectiveness of counsel. Although some of the 
judges of the court proposed different approaches to judging 
ineffectiveness claims either generally or when raised in fed-
eral habeas petitions from state prisoners, id., at 1264-1280 
(opinion of Tjoflat, J.); id., at 1280 (opinion of Clark, J.); id., 
at 1285-1288 (opinion of Roney, J., joined by Fay and Hill, 
JJ.); id., at 1288-1291 (opinion of Hill, J.), and although some 
believed that no remand was necessary in this case, id., at 
1281-1285 (opinion of Johnson, J., joined by Anderson, J.); 
id., at 1285-1288 (opinion of Roney, J., joined by Fay and 
Hill, JJ.); id., at 1288-1291 (opinion of Hill, J.), a majority 
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of the judges of the en banc court agreed that the case should 
be remanded for application of the newly announced stand-
ards. Summarily rejecting respondent's claims other than 
ineffectiveness of counsel, the court accordingly reversed the 
judgment of the District Court and remanded the case. On 
remand, the court finally ruled, the state trial judge's testi-
mony, though admissible "to the extent that it contains per-
sonal knowledge of historical facts or expert opinion," was 
not to be considered admitted into evidence to explain the 
judge's mental processes in reaching his sentencing decision. 
Id., at 1262-1263; see Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U. S. 276, 
306-307 (1904). 
D 
Petitioners, who are officials of the State of Florida, filed a 
petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the decision 
of the Court of Appeals. The petition presents a type of 
SLxth Amendment claim that this Court has not previously 
considered in any generality. The Court has considered 
Sixth Amendment claims based on actual or constructive de-
nial of the assistance of counsel altogether, as well as claims 
based on state interference with the ability of counsel to ren-
der effective assistance to the accused. E. g., United States 
v. Cronic, ante, p, 648. With the exception of Cuyler v. 
S Iwan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980), however, which involved a 
claim that counsel's assistance was rendered ineffective by 
a conflict of interest, the Court has never directly and fully 
addressed a claim of "actual ineffectiveness" of counsel's 
assistance in a case going to trial. Cf. United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 102, n. 5 (1976). 
In assessing attorney performance, all the Federal Courts of 
Appeals and all but a few state courts have now adopted the 
"reasonably effective assistance" standard in one formulation 
or another. See Trapnell v. United States, 725 F. 2d 149, 
151-152 (C A21983); App. B to Brief for United States in United 
States v. Cronic, O. T. 1983, No. 82-660, pp. 3a-6a; Sarno, 
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Modern Status of Rules and Standards in State Courts as to 
Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of Criminal 
Client, 2 A. L. R. 4th 99-157, §§ 7-10 (1980). Yet this Court 
has not had occasion squarely to decide whether that is the 
proper standard. With respect to the prejudice that a de-
fendant must show from deficient attorney performance, the 
lower courts have adopted tests that purport to differ in more 
than formulation. See App. C to Brief for United States in 
United States v. Cronic, supra, at 7a-10a; Sarno, supra, at 
83-99, § 6. In particular, the Court of Appeals in this case 
expressly rejected the prejudice standard articulated by 
Judge Leventhal in his plurality opinion in United States v. 
Decoster, 199 U. S. App. D. C. 359, 371, 374-375, 624 F. 2d 
196, 208, 211-212 (en banc), cert, denied, 444 U. S. 944 
(1979), and adopted by the State of Florida in Knight v. 
State, 394 So. 2d, at 1001, a standard that requires a show-
ing that specified deficient conduct of counsel was likely 
to have affected the outcome of the proceeding. 693 F. 2d, 
at 1261-1262. 
For these reasons, we granted certiorari to consider the 
standards by which to judge a contention that the Constitu-
tion requires that a criminal judgment be overturned because 
of the actual ineffective assistance of counsel. 462 U. S. 
1105 (1983). We agree with the Court of Appeals that 
the exhaustion rule requiring dismissal of mixed petitions, 
though to be strictly enforced, is not jurisdictional. See 
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S., at 515-520. We therefore ad-
dress the merits of the constitutional issue. 
II 
In a long line of cases that includes Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U. S. 45 (1932), Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), and 
Gideon v. Waintvright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), this Court has 
recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, 
and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a 
fair trial. The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through 
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the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of 
a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory proc-
ess for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 
Thus, a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adver-
sarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolu-
tion of issues defined in advance of the proceeding. The 
right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system 
embodied in the SLxth Amendment, since access to counsel's 
skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the 
"ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution" to 
which they are entitled. Adams v. United States ex re! 
McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275, 276 (1942); see Powell v. Ala-
bama, supra, at 68-69. 
Because of the vital importance of counsel's assistance, thi-
Court has held that, with certain exceptions, a person ac-
cused of a federal or state crime has the right to have counsel 
appointed if retained counsel cannot be obtained. See 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Waw-
wright, supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. That a person 
who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the 
accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional 
command. The SLxth Amendment recognizes the right to 
the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's play-
ing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial sys-
tem to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be 
assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who 
plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair. 
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For that reason, the Court has recognized that "the right 
to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970). 
Government violates the right to effective assistance when it 
interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make 
independent decisions about how to conduct the defense. 
See, e. g., Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976) (bar 
on attorney-client consultation during overnight recess); Her-
ring v. New York, 422 U. S. 853 (1975) (bar on summation at 
bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605, 612-613 
(1972) (requirement that defendant be first defense witness); 
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U. S. 570, 593-596 (1961) (bar on 
direct examination of defendant). Counsel, however, can 
also deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance, 
simply by failing to render "adequate legal assistance," Cuy-
ler v, Sullivan, 446 U. S., at 344. Id., at 345-350 (actual 
conflict of interest adversely affecting lawyer's performance 
renders assistance ineffective). 
The Court has not elaborated on the meaning of the con-
stitutional requirement of effective assistance in the latter 
class of cases—that is, those presenting claims of "actual inef-
fectiveness." In giving meaning to the requirement, how-
ever, we must take its purpose—to ensure a fair trial—as the 
guide. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffective-
ness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. 
The same principle applies to a capital sentencing proceed-
ing such as that provided by Florida law. We need not con-
sider the role of counsel in an ordinary sentencing, which may 
involve informal proceedings and standardless discretion in 
the sentencer, and hence may require a different approach to 
the definition of constitutionally effective assistance. A cap-
ital sentencing proceeding like the one involved in this case, 
however, is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format 
and in the existence of standards for decision, see Barclay 
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v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 952-954 (1983); Bullington v. 
Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981), that counsel's role in the 
proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial—to en-
sure that the adversarial testing process works to produce 
a just result under the standards governing decision. For 
purposes of describing counsel's duties, therefore, Florida's 
capital sentencing proceeding need not be distinguished from 
an ordinarv trial. 
Il l 
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was 
so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death 
sentence has two components. First, the defendant must 
show that counsel's performance was deficient. This re-
quires showing that counsel made errors so serious that coun-
sel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the de-
fendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were 
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both 
showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sen-
tence resulted from a break J n in the adversary process 
that renders the result unreliable. 
A 
As all the Federal Courts of Appeals have now held. :he 
proper standard for attorney performance is that of reason-
ably effective assistance. See Trapnell v. United States. 725 
F. 2d, at 151-152. The Court indirectly recognized as much 
when it stated in McMann v. Richardson, supra, at 770. 771. 
that a guilty plea cannot be attacked as based on inadequate 
legal advice unless counsel was not "a reasonably competent 
attorney" and the advice was not "within the i*ange of compe-
tence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." See ai>o 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 344. When a convicted ie-
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fendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assist-
ance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
More specific guidelines are not appropriate. The Sixth 
Amendment refers simply to "counsel," not specifying par-
ticular requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead 
on the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient 
to justify the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the 
role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions. 
See Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 100-101 (1955). The 
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. 
Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic 
duties. Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and 
hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to 
avoid conflicts of interest. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 
346. From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant 
derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's 
cause and the more particular duties to consult with the 
defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant 
informed of important developments in the course of the 
prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such 
skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adver-
sarial testing process. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S., 
at 68-69. 
These basic duties neither exhaustively define the obliga-
tions of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of 
attorney performance. In any case presenting an ineffec-
tiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether 
counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the cir-
cumstances. Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in 
American Bar Association standards and the like, e. g., ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) 
("The Defense Function"), are guides to determining what is 
reasonable, but they are only guides. No particular set of 
detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take 
STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 689 
668 Opinion of the Court 
account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense 
counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how 
best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of 
rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected 
independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude coun-
sel must have in making tactical decisions. See United 
States v. Decoster, 199 U. S. App. D. C , at 371. 624 F. 2d. 
at 208. Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for rep-
resentation could distract counsel from the overriding mis-
sion of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause. More-
over, the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of 
the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal 
representation, although that is a goal of considerable impor-
tance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure 
that criminal defendants receive a fair trial. 
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-
guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sen-
tence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's 
defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that 
a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. 
Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 183-134 (1982). A fair 
assessment of attorney performance requires that every ef-
fort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, 
to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged con-
duct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective 
at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making 
the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption 
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of rea-
sonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant mu>: 
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstance-, 
the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strat-
egy." See Michel v. Louisiana, supra, at 101. There are 
countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given 
case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would n<>: 
defend a particular client in the same way. See Goodpaster. 
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The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 299, 343 (1983). 
The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney 
performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would 
encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges. 
Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would 
increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of 
counsel's unsuccessful defense. Counsel's performance and 
even willingness to serve could be adversely affected. In-
tensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for accept-
able assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the inde-
pendence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of 
assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney 
and client. 
Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must 
judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on 
the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of coun-
sel's conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of in-
effective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of 
counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reason-
able professional judgment. The court must then determine 
whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts 
or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance. In making that determination, the 
court should keep in mind that counsel's function, as elabo-
rated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adver-
sarial testing process work in the particular case. At the 
same time, the court should recognize that counsel is strongly 
presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all 
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment. 
These standards require no special amplification in order to 
define counsel's duty to investigate, the duty at issue in this 
case. As the Court of Appeals concluded, strategic choices 
made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant 
to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strate-
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gic choices made after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable profes-
sional judgments support the limitations on investigation. 
In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable inves-
tigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes par-
ticular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness 
case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly 
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, apply-
ing a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. 
The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined 
or substantially influenced by the defendant's own state-
ments or actions. Counsel's actions are usually bashed, quite 
properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defend-
ant and on information supplied by the defendant. In par-
ticular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depend.-
critically on such information. For example, when the fact-
that support a certain potential line of defense are Lreneralh 
known to counsel because of what the defendant ha> .-aid. the 
need for further investigation may be considerably dimin-
ished or eliminated altogether. And when a defendant ha.-
given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain m\ ('-li-
gations would be fruitless or even harmful, coun.-e:'- fai.ure 
to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged a> 
unreasonable. In short, inquiry into eoun-el'.- conversation.-
with the defendant may be critical to a proper a.-.-e-.-mer.: of 
counsel's investigation decisions, just as it may be cntica. in 
a proper assessment of counsel's other litigation decL-i<>n> 
See United States v. Decoster. *upm. at 372-373. 624 F 2d. 
at 209-210. 
B 
An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable. 
does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal pro-
ceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. <"f. ('» '"< 
States v. Morrison, 449 U. S. 361, 364-363 • 19M •. The pur-
pose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of coun.-e. ..- to ,.»> 
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sure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify 
reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any 
deficiencies in counsel's performance must be prejudicial to 
the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under 
the Constitution. 
In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is pre-
sumed. Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of 
counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. 
So are various kinds of state interference with counsel's 
assistance. See United States v. Cronic, ante, at 659, and 
n. 25. Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that case-
by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost. Ante, at 
658. Moreover, such circumstances involve impairments of 
the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for 
that reason and because the prosecution is directly responsible, 
easy for the government to prevent. 
One type of actual ineffectiveness claim warrants a similar, 
though more limited, presumption of prejudice. In Cuyler 
v. Sullivan, 446 U. S., at 345-350, the Court held that preju-
dice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual con-
flict of interest. In those circumstances, counsel breaches 
the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's du-
ties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise effect 
on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting 
interests. Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts 
of interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry 
in certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, see, e. g., 
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 44(c), it is reasonable for the criminal 
justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed 
prejudice for conflicts of interest. Even so, the rule is not 
quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists for the Sixth 
Amendment claims mentioned above. Prejudice is pre-
sumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel "ac-
tively represented conflicting interests" and that "an actual 
conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's perform-
ance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 350, 348 (footnote 
omitted). 
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Conflict of interest claims aside, actual ineffectiveness 
claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are sub-
ject to a general requirement that the defendant affirma-
tively prove prejudice. The government is not responsible 
for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney errors that will 
result in reversal of a conviction or sentence. Attorney er-
rors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly 
harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial. 
They cannot be classified according to likelihood of causing 
prejudice. Nor can they be defined with sufficient precision 
to inform defense attorneys correctly just what conduct to 
avoid. Representation is an art, and an act or omission that 
is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in 
another. Even if a defendant shows that particular errors of 
counsel were unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must 
show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense. 
It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors 
had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceed-
ing. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet 
that test, cf. United States v. Valeyizaela-BeimaU 458 U. S. 
858, 866-867 (1982), and not every error that conceivably 
could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability 
of the result of the proceeding. Respondent suggests re-
quiring a showing that the errors "impaired the presentation 
of the defense." Brief for Respondent 58. That standard, 
however, provides no workable principle. Since any error, 
if it is indeed an error, "impairs" the presentation of the de-
fense, the proposed standard is inadequate because it pro-
vides no way of deciding what impairments are sufficiently se-
rious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding. 
On the other hand, we believe that a defendant need not 
show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not al-
tered the outcome in the case. This outcome-determinative 
standard has several strengths. It defines the relevant in-
quiry in a way familiar to courts, though the inquiry, as is 
inevitable, is anything but precise. The standard also re-
flects the profound importance of finality in criminal proceed-
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ings. Moreover, it comports with the widely used standard 
for assessing motions for new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 
19-20, and nn. 10, 11. Nevertheless, the standard is not 
quite appropriate. 
Even when the specified attorney error results in the omis-
sion of certain evidence, the newly discovered evidence 
standard is not an apt source from which to draw a prejudice 
standard for ineffectiveness claims. The high standard for 
newly discovered evidence claims presupposes that all the 
essential elements of a presumptively accurate and fair pro-
ceeding were present in the proceeding whose result is chal-
lenged. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 327 U. S. 106, 112 
(1946). An ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence 
of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceed-
ing is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and 
the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat 
lower. The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreli-
able, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors 
of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evi-
dence to have determined the outcome. 
Accordingly, the appropriate test for prejudice finds its 
roots in the test for materiality of exculpatory information 
not disclosed to the defense by the prosecution, United States 
v. Agurs, 427 U. S., at 104, 112-113, and in the test for ma-
teriality of testimony made unavailable to the defense by 
Government deportation of a witness, United States v. 
Valenzuela-Bernal, supra, at 872-874. The defendant must 
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for coun-
sel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different. A reasonable probability is a probabil-
ity sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 
In making the determination whether the specified errors 
resulted in the required prejudice, a court should presume, 
absent challenge to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary 
insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted according to law. 
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An assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable to 
the defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, 
whimsy, caprice, "nullification," and the like. A defendant 
has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker, 
even if a lawless decision cannot be reviewed. The assess-
ment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the 
decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially 
applying the standards that govern the decision. It should 
not depend on the idiosyncracies of the particular decision-
maker, such as unusual propensities toward harshness or le-
niency. Although these factors may actually have entered 
into counsel's selection of strategies and, to that limited ex-
tent, may thus affect the performance inquiry, they are 
irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry. Thus, evidence about 
the actual process of decision, if not part of the record of the 
proceeding under review, and evidence about, for example, a 
particular judge's sentencing practices, should not be consid-
ered in the prejudice determination. 
The governing legal standard plays a critical role in defin-
ing the question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from 
counsel's errors. When a defendant challenges a conviction, 
the question is whether there is a reasonable probability 
that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a 
reasonable doubt respecting guilt. When a defendant chal-
lenges a death sentence such as the one at issue in this case, 
the question is whether there is a reasonable probability 
that, absent the errors, the sentencer—including an appel-
late court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evi-
dence—would have concluded that the balance of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. 
In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffec-
tiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence be-
fore the judge or jury. Some of the factual findings will have 
been unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were 
affected will have been affected in different ways. Some 
errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to 
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be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary 
picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect. 
Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by 
the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than 
one with overwhelming record support. Taking the unaf-
fected findings as a given, and taking due account of the ef-
fect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court making 
the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the 
burden of showing that the decision reached would reason-
ably likely have been different absent the errors. 
IV 
A number of practical considerations are important for the 
application of the standards we have outlined. Most impor-
tant, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of coun-
sel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have 
stated do not establish mechanical rules. Although those 
principles should guide the process of decision, the ultimate 
focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the 
proceeding whose result is being challenged. In every case 
the court should be concerned with whether, despite the 
strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular 
proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adver-
sarial process that our system counts on to produce just 
results. 
To the extent that this has already been the guiding in-
quiry in the lower courts, the standards articulated today do 
not require reconsideration of ineffectiveness claims rejected 
under different standards. Cf. Trapnell v. United States, 
725 F. 2d, at 153 (in several years of applying "farce and 
mockery" standard along with Reasonable competence" 
standard, court "never found that the result of a case hinged 
on the choice of a particular standard"). In particular, the 
minor differences in the lower courts' precise formulations 
of the performance standard are insignificant: the different 
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formulations are mere variations of the overarching reason-
ableness standard. With regard to the prejudice inquiry, 
only the strict outcome-determinative test, among the stand-
ards articulated in the lower courts, imposes a heavier bur-
den on defendants than the tests laid down today. The dif-
ference, however, should alter the merit of an ineffectiveness 
claim only in the rarest case. 
Although we have discussed the performance component of 
an ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice component. 
there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assur-
ance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or e\ en 
to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant 
makes an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court 
need not determine whether counsel's performance wa> deri-
cient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defend-
ant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object <>f an 
ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counselV performance 
If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on tht-
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expec: wn. 
often be so, that course should be followed. Court?- >|,itiiiii 
strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not becor:e -.. 
burdensome to defense counsel that the entire cnmina. LL— 
tice system suffers as a result. 
The principles governing ineffectiveness chum- >:.'>uid 
apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do «»n «::rec* 
appeal or in motions for a new trial. As indicated b;. :he 
"cause and prejudice" test for overcoming procedural wa/. er-
of claims of error, the presumption that a criminal ;udtr^en: 
is final is at its strongest in collateral attacks on that .de-
ment. See United States v. Fradi/, 456 U. S. 152. 162-16H 
(1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126-125* «19*2» Ar. 
ineffectiveness claim, however, as our articulation <»: 'He-
standards that govern decision of such claims marits L.t-ar 
is an attack on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding 
whose result is challenged. Since fundamental faime — -
the central concern of the writ of habeas corniL-, -*- ' 
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at 126, no special standards ought to apply to ineffectiveness 
claims made in habeas proceedings. 
Finally, in a federal habeas challenge to a state criminal 
judgment, a state court conclusion that counsel rendered ef-
fective assistance is not a finding of fact binding on the fed-
eral court to the extent stated by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). In-
effectiveness is not a question of "basic, primary, or historical 
facft]," Toumsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 309, n. 6 (1963). 
Rather, like the question whether multiple representation in 
a particular case gave rise to a conflict of interest, it is a 
mixed question of law and fact. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 
U. S., at 342. Although state court findings of fact made in 
the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to 
the deference requirement of § 2254(d), and although district 
court findings are subject to the clearly erroneous standard 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), both the perform-
ance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry 
are mixed questions of law and fact. 
V 
Having articulated general standards for judging ineffec-
tiveness claims, we think it useful to apply those standards to 
the facts of this case in order to illustrate the meaning of the 
general principles. The record makes it possible to do so. 
There are no conflicts between the state and federal courts 
over findings of fact, and the principles we have articulated 
are sufficiently close to the principles applied both in the 
Florida courts and in the District Court that it is clear that 
the factfinding was not affected by erroneous legal principles. 
See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 291-292 
(1982). 
Application of the governing principles is not difficult in 
this case. The facts as described above, see supra, at 671-
678, make clear that the conduct of respondent's counsel at and 
before respondent's sentencing proceeding cannot be found 
unreasonable. They also make clear that, even assuming the 
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challenged conduct of counsel was unreasonable, respondent 
suffered insufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside his 
death sentence. 
With respect to the performance component, the record 
shows that respondent's counsel made a strategic choice to 
argue for the extreme emotional distress mitigating circum-
stance and to rely as fully as possible on respondent's accept-
ance of responsibility for his crimes. Although counsel un-
derstandably felt hopeless about respondent's prospects, see 
App. 383-384, 400-401, nothing in the record indicates, as 
one possible reading of the District Court's opinion suggests, 
see App. to Pet. for Cert. A282, that counsel's sense of hope-
lessness distorted his professional judgment. Counsel's 
strategy choice was well within the range of professionally 
reasonable judgments, and the decision not to seek more 
character or psychological evidence than was already in hand 
was likewise reasonable. 
The trial judge's views on the importance of owning up to 
one's crimes were well known to counsel. The aggravating 
circumstances were utterly overwhelming. Trial counsel 
could reasonably surmise from his conversations with re-
spondent that character and psychological evidence w ould be 
of little help. Respondent had already been able to mention 
at the plea colloquy the substance of what there was to know 
about his financial and emotional troubles. Restricting testi-
mony on respondent's character to what had come in at the 
plea colloquy ensured that contrary character and psychologi-
cal evidence and respondent's criminal history, which counsel 
had successfully moved to exclude, would not come in. On 
these facts, there can be little question, even without applica-
tion of the presumption of adequate performance, that trial 
counsel's defense, though unsuccessful, was the result of rea-
sonable professional judgment. 
With respect to the prejudice component, the lack of merit 
of respondent's claim is even more stark. The evidence that 
respondent says his trial counsel should have offered at the 
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sentencing hearing would barely have altered the sentencing 
profile presented to the sentencing judge. As the state 
courts and District Court found, at most this evidence shows 
that numerous people who knew respondent thought he was 
generally a good person and that a psychiatrist and a psy-
chologist believed he was under considerable emotional 
stress that did not rise to the level of extreme disturbance. 
Given the overwhelming aggravating factors, there is no 
reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have 
changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances and, hence, the 
sentence imposed. Indeed, admission of the evidence re-
spondent now offers might even have been harmful to his 
case: his "rap sheet" would probably have been admitted into 
evidence, and the psychological reports would have directly 
contradicted respondent's claim that the mitigating circum-
stance of extreme emotional disturbance applied to his case. 
Our conclusions on both the prejudice and performance 
components of the ineffectiveness inquiry do not depend on 
the trial judge's testimony at the District Court hearing. 
We therefore need not consider the general admissibility of 
that testimony, although, as noted supra, at 695, that testi-
mony is irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry. Moreover, the 
prejudice question is resolvable, and hence the ineffective-
ness claim can be rejected, without regard to the evidence 
presented at the District Court hearing. The state courts 
properly concluded that the ineffectiveness claim was merit-
less without holding an evidentiary hearing. 
Failure to make the required showing of either deficient 
performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffective-
ness claim. Here there is a double failure. More generally, 
respondent has made no showing that the justice of his sen-
tence was rendered unreliable by a breakdown in the adver-
sary process caused by deficiencies in counsel's assistance. 
Respondent's sentencing proceeding was not fundamentally 
unfair. 
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We conclude, therefore, that the District Court properly 
declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is accordingly 
Reversed. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
I join the Court's opinion but dissent from its judgment. 
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circum-
stances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I would 
vacate respondent's death sentence and remand the case for 
further proceedings.1 
1
 The Court's judgment leaves standing another in an increasing number 
of capital sentences purportedly imposed in compliance with the procedural 
standards developed in cases beginning with Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U. S. 
153 (1976>. Earlier this Term, I reiterated my view that these procedural 
requirements have proven unequal to the task of eliminating the irrational-
ity that necessarily attends decisions by juries, trial judges, and appellate 
courts whether to take or spare human life. Pulley v. Hams. 465 U. S. 
37, 59 (1984) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The inherent difficulty in im-
posing the ultimate sanction consistent with the rule of law. see Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 274-277 (1972) (BRENNAN. J., concurring;: 
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 248-312 (1971) (BRENNAN. J., 
dissenting), is confirmed by the extraordinary pressure put on our own 
deliberations in recent months by the growing number of applications to 
stay executions. See Wainurright v. Adams, post, at 965 (MARSHALL. J., 
dissenting) (stating that "haste and confusion surrounding . . . deci-
sion [to vacate stay] is degrading to our role as judges"1*: Autry v. 
McKaskle, 465 U. S. 1085 (1984) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
Court for "dramatically expediting its normal deliberative processes to 
clear the way for an impending execution"): Stephens v. Kemp. 464 U. S. 
1027, 1032 (1983) (POWELL, J., dissenting) (contending that procedures by 
which stay applications are considered "undermines public confidence in 
the courts and in the laws we are required to follow"): Sullivan v. Wain-
wright, 464 U. S. 109, 112 (1983) (BURGER. C. J., concurring; (accusing 
lawyers seeking review of their client's death sentences of turning "the 
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I 
This case and United States v. Cronic, ante, p. 648, 
present our first occasions to elaborate the appropriate 
standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. In Cronic, the Court considers such claims in the 
context of cases "in which the surrounding circumstances 
[make] it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effec-
tive assistance that ineffectiveness [is] properly presumed 
without inquiry into actual performance at trial," ante, at 
661. This case, in contrast, concerns claims of ineffective 
assistance based on allegations of specific errors by counsel— 
claims which, by their very nature, require courts to evaluate 
both the attorney's performance and the effect of that per-
formance on the reliability and fairness of the proceeding. 
Accordingly, a defendant making a claim of this kind must 
show not only that his lawyer's performance was inadequate 
but also that he was prejudiced thereby. See also Cronic, 
ante, at 659, n. 26. 
I join the Court's opinion because I believe that the stand-
ards it sets out today will both provide helpful guidance to 
courts considering claims of actual ineffectiveness of counsel 
and also permit those courts to continue their efforts to achieve 
progressive development of this area of the law. Like all 
federal courts and most state courts that have previously ad-
dressed the matter, see ante, at 683-684, the Court concludes 
that "the proper standard for attorney performance is that 
of reasonably effective assistance." Ante, at 687. And, 
administration of justice into [a] sporting contest"); Autry v. Estelle, 
464 U. S. 1, 6 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Court's 
practice in reviewing applications in death cases 'injects uncertainty and 
disparity into the review procedure, adds to the burdens of counsel, dis-
torts the deliberative process within this Court, and increases the risk of 
error"). It is difficult to believe that the decision whether to put an indi-
vidual to death generates any less emotional pressure among juries, trial 
judges, and appellate courts than it does among Members of this Court. 
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rejecting the strict "outcome-determinative" test employed 
by some courts, the Court adopts as the appropriate stand-
ard for prejudice a requirement that the defendant "show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different," defining a "reasonable probability" 
as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Ante, at 694. I believe these standards are 
sufficiently precise to permit meaningful distinctions between 
those attorney derelictions that deprive defendants of their 
constitutional rights and those that do not; at the same time, 
the standards are sufficiently flexible to accommodate the 
wide variety of situations giving rise to claims of this kind. 
With respect to the performance standard, I agree with 
the Court's conclusion that a "particular set of detailed rules 
for counsel's conduct" would be inappropriate. Ante, at 6SS. 
Precisely because the standard of "reasonably effective as-
sistance" adopted today requires that counsel's performance 
be measured in light of the particular circumstances of the 
case, I do not believe our decision "will stunt the develop-
ment of constitutional doctrine in this area," post, at 709 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court's suggestion 
that today's decision is largely consistent with the approach 
taken by the lower courts, ante, at 696, simply indicates that 
those courts may continue to develop governing principles on 
a case-by-case basis in the common-law tradition, as they have 
in the past. Similarly, the prejudice standard announced 
today does not erect an insurmountable obstacle to meri-
torious claims, but rather simply requires courts carefully 
to examine trial records in light of both the nature and seri-
ousness of counsel's errors and their effect in the particular 
circumstances of the case. Ante, at 695.2 
2
 Indeed, counsel's incompetence can be so serious that it rises .to the 
level of a constructive denial of counsel which can constitute constitutional 
error without any showing of prejudice. See Cronic, ante, at 659-660; 
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II 
Because of their flexibility and the requirement that they 
be considered in light of the particular circumstances of the 
case, the standards announced today can and should be 
applied with concern for the special considerations that 
must attend review of counsel's performance in a capital sen-
tencing proceeding. In contrast to a case in which a finding 
of ineffective assistance requires a new trial, a conclusion 
that counsel was ineffective with respect to only the penalty 
phase of a capital trial imposes on the State the far lesser 
burden of reconsideration of the sentence alone. On the 
other hand, the consequences to the defendant of incompe-
tent assistance at a capital sentencing could not, of course, 
be greater. Recognizing the unique seriousness of such a 
proceeding, we have repeatedly emphasized that "'where 
discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave 
as the determination of whether a human life should be taken 
or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and 
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and 
capricious action.'" Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 
874 (1983) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 188-189 
(opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.)). 
For that reason, we have consistently required that capital 
proceedings be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant 
concern for procedural fairness and for the accuracy of fact-
finding. As JUSTICE MARSHALL emphasized last Term: 
"This Court has always insisted that the need for pro-
cedural safeguards is particularly great where life is at 
stake. Long before the Court established the right to 
counsel in all felony cases, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U. S. 335 (1963), it recognized that right in capital cases, 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 71-72 (1932). Time 
Javor v. United States, 724 F. 2d 831, 834 (CA9 1984) ("Prejudice is inher-
ent in this case because unconscious or sleeping counsel is equivalent to no 
counsel at all"). 
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and again the Court has condemned procedures in capital 
cases that might be completely acceptable in an ordinary 
case. See, e. g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 
(1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 (1980); Green v. 
Georgia, 442 U. S. 95 (1979) (per curiam); Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 
U. S. 349 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 
280 (1976). . . . 
"Because of th[e] basic difference between the death 
penalty and all other punishments, this Court has con-
sistently recognized that there is 'a corresponding differ-
ence in the need for reliability in the determination that 
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.' 
Ibid:1 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 913-914 (1983) 
(dissenting opinion). 
See also id., at 924 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). In short, 
this Court has taken special care to minimize the possibility 
that death sentences are "imposed out of whim, passion, 
prejudice, or mistake." Eddnigs v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 
104, 118 (1982) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). 
In the sentencing phase of a capital case, "[w]hat is essen-
tial is that the jury have before it all possible relevant in-
formation about the individual defendant whose fate it must 
determine." Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 276 (1976) 
(opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). For that 
reason, we have repeatedly insisted that "the sentencer in 
capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant miti-
gating factor." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S.. at 112. 
In fact, as JUSTICE O'CONNOR has noted, a sentencing 
judge's failure to consider relevant aspects of a defendant's 
character and background creates such an unacceptable risk 
that the death penalty was unconstitutionally imposed that, 
even in cases where the matter was not raised below, the 
"interests of justice" may impose on reviewing courts "a duty 
'to remand [the] case for resentencing." Id., at 117, n., and 
119 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). 
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Of course, "[t]he right to present, and to have the sen-
tencer consider, any and all mitigating evidence means little 
if defense counsel fails to look for mitigating evidence or fails 
to present a case in mitigation at the capital sentencing hear-
ing." Comment, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1544, 1549 (1983). See, 
e. g., Burger v. Zant, 718 F. 2d 979 (CAll 1983) (defendant, 
17 years old at time of crime, sentenced to death after counsel 
failed to present any evidence in mitigation), stay granted, 
post, at 902. Accordingly, counsel's general duty to investi-
gate, ante, at 690, takes on supreme importance to a de-
fendant in the context of developing mitigating evidence to 
present to a judge or jury considering the sentence of death; 
claims of ineffective assistance in the performance of that 
duty should therefore be considered with commensurate 
care. 
That the Court rejects the ineffective-assistance claim in 
this case should not, of course, be understood to reflect any 
diminution in commitment to the principle that " 'the funda-
mental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment . . . requires consideration of the character and record 
of the individual offender and the circumstances of the par-
ticular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the 
process of inflicting the penalty of death.'" Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, supra, at 112 (quoting Woodson v. Noiih Caro-
lina, 428 U. S. 280, 304 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, 
and STEVENS, JJ.)). I am satisfied that the standards an-
nounced today will go far towards assisting lower federal 
courts and state courts in discharging their constitutional 
duty to ensure that every criminal defendant receives the 
effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a per-
son accused of a crime the right to the aid of a lawyer in pre-
paring and presenting his defense. Tf lias long been settled 
that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assist-
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ance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759. 
771, n. 14 (1970). The state and lower federal courts have 
developed standards for distinguishing effective from inade-
quate assistance.1 Today, for the first time, this Court at-
tempts to synthesize and clarify those standards. For the 
most part, the majority's efforts are unhelpful. Neither of 
its two principal holdings seems to me likely to improve the 
adjudication of Sixth Amendment claims. And, in its zeal to 
survey comprehensively this field of doctrine, the majority 
makes many other generalizations and suggestions that I find 
unacceptable. Most importantly, the majority fails to take 
adequate account of the fact that the locus of this case is a 
capital sentencing proceeding. Accordingly, I join neither 
the Court's opinion nor its judgment. 
I 
The opinion of the Court revolves around two holdings 
First, the majority ties the constitutional minima of attorney 
performance to a simple "standard of reasonableness" 
Ante, at 688. Second, the majority holds that only an errnr 
of counsel that has sufficient impact on a trial to "undermine 
confidence in the outcome" is grounds for overtumine a con-
viction. Ante, at 694. I disagree with both of the>e ruiimr> 
A 
My objection to the performance standard adopted by :he 
Court is that it is so malleable that, in practice, it will either 
have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the 
manner in which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and 
applied by different courts. To tell lawyers and the lower 
courts that counsel for a criminal defendant must behave 
' See Note Identifying and Remedying Ineffec::\e A. -^urxv >i'"- m.-
nal Defense Counsel: A New Look After ['nittn <ta'>< \ D*^>-'>r "'. 
Han-. L. Rev. 752, 756-758 < 1°M)). Note. E:Tect;\e A.-L-tar.c- :' r . „ - -
The Sixth Amendment and the Fair Trial Guarantee. '** L" « ~. L H-» 
1380. 1386-13^7, 1399-1401. lli)>-14W t 1 < ^ I 
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"reasonably" and must act like "a reasonably competent at-
torney," ante, at 687, is to tell them almost nothing. In 
essence, the majority has instructed judges called upon to 
assess claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to advert 
to their own intuitions regarding what constitutes "profes-
sional" representation, and has discouraged them from trying 
to develop more detailed standards governing the perform-
ance of defense counsel. In my view, the Court has thereby 
not only abdicated its own responsiblity to interpret the Con-
stitution, but also impaired the ability of the lower courts to 
exercise theirs. 
The debilitating ambiguity of an "objective standard of rea-
sonableness" in this context is illustrated by the majority's 
failure to address important issues concerning the quality 
of representation mandated by the Constitution. It is an 
unfortunate but undeniable fact that a person of means, by 
selecting a lawyer and paying him enough to ensure he pre-
pares thoroughly, usually can obtain better representation 
than that available to an indigent defendant, who must rely 
on appointed counsel, who, in turn, has limited time and re-
sources to devote to a given case. Is a "reasonably compe-
tent attorney" a reasonably competent adequately paid re-
tained lawyer or a reasonably competent appointed attorney? 
It is also a fact that the quality of representation available to 
ordinary defendants in different parts of the country varies 
significantly. Should the standard of performance mandated 
by the Sixth Amendment vary by locale?2 The majority of-
fers no clues as to the proper responses to these questions. 
The majority defends its refusal to adopt more specific 
standards primarily on the ground that "[n]o particular set of 
detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take ac-
2Cf., e. g.f Moore v. United States, 432 F. 2d 730, 736 (CA3 1970) (defin-
ing the constitutionally required level of performance as "the exercise of 
the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and 
place"). " 
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count of the variety of circumstances faced by defense coun-
sel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to 
represent a criminal defendant." Ante, at 688-689. I agree 
that counsel must be afforded "wide latitude" when making 
"tactical decisions" regarding trial strategy, see ante, at 689; 
cf. infra, at 712, 713, but many aspects of the job of a criminal 
defense attorney are more amenable to judicial oversight. 
For example, much of the work involved in preparing for a 
trial, applying for bail, conferring with one's client, making 
timely objections to significant, arguably erroneous rulings of 
the trial judge, and filing a notice of appeal if there are color-
able grounds therefor could profitably be made the subject of 
uniform standards. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case represents 
one sound attempt to develop particularized standards de-
signed to ensure that all defendants receive effective legal 
assistance. See 693 F. 2d 1243, 1251-1258 (CAS 1982) (en 
banc). For other, generally consistent efforts, see United 
States v. Decoster, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 326, 333-334, 487 
F. 2d 1197, 1203-1204 (1973), disapproved on rehearing, 199 
U. S. App. D. C. 359, 624 F. 2d 196 (en banc), cert, denied. 
444 U. S. 944 (1979); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F. 2d 224, 226 
(CA4), cert, denied, 393 U. S. 849 (1968); People v. Pope, 23 
Cal. 3d 412, 424-425, 590 P. 2d 859, 866 (1979); State v. 
Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 550-557, 205 N. W. 2d 1, 6-9 (1973).: 
By refusing to address the merits of these proposals, and 
indeed suggesting that no such effort is worthwhile, the 
opinion of the Court, I fear, will stunt the development of 
constitutional doctrine in this area. 
3
 For a review of other decisions attempting to develop guidelines for 
assessment of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, see Erickson. 
Standards of Competency for Defense Counsel in a Criminal Case. 17 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 233, 242-248 (1979). Many of these decisions rely heavily 
on the standards developed by the American Bar Association. See ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1—4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980). 
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B 
I object to the prejudice standard adopted by the Court for 
two independent reasons. First, it is often very difficult to 
tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial in which he 
was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his 
lawyer had been competent. Seemingly impregnable cases 
can sometimes be dismantled by good defense counsel. On 
the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a review-
ing court confidently to ascertain how the government's evi-
dence and arguments would have stood up against rebuttal 
and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer. 
The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are ex-
acerbated by the possibility that evidence of injury to the de-
fendant may be missing from the record precisely because of 
the incompetence of defense counsel.4 In view of all these 
impediments to a fair evaluation of the probability that the 
outcome of a trial was affected by ineffectiveness of counsel, 
it seems to me senseless to impose on a defendant whose law-
yer has been shown to have been incompetent the burden of 
demonstrating prejudice. 
4Cf. United States v. Ellison, 557 F. 2d 128, 131 (CA7 1977). In dis-
cussing the related problem of measuring injury caused by joint represen-
tation of conflicting interests, we observed: 
"{TJhe ev i l . . . is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain 
from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotia-
tions and in the sentencing process. It may be possible in some cases to 
identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney's failure 
to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing 
hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of 
a conflict on the attorney's representation of a client. And to assess the 
impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and de-
cisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an in-
quiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, 
unguided speculation." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475, 490-491 
(1978) (emphasis in original). 
When defense counsel fails to take certain actions, not because he is "com-
pelled" to do so, but because he is incompetent, it is <n*>n equally difficult 
to ascertain the prejudice consequent upon his omissions. 
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Second and more fundamentally, the assumption on which 
the Court's holding rests is that the only purpose of the con-
stitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is to 
reduce the chance that innocent persons will be convicted. 
In my view, the guarantee also functions to ensure that con-
victions are obtained only through fundamentally fair proce-
dures.5 The majority contends that the Sixth Amendment is 
not violated when a manifestly guilty defendant is convicted 
after a trial in which he was represented by a manifestly inef-
fective attorney. I cannot agree. Every defendant is enti-
tled to a trial in which his interests are vigorously and con-
scientiously advocated by an able lawyer. A proceeding in 
which the defendant does not receive meaningful assistance 
in meeting the forces of the State does not, in my opinion, 
constitute due process. 
In Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 23 (1967), we 
acknowledged that certain constitutional rights are "so basic 
to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as 
harmless error." Among these rights is the right to the 
assistance of counsel at trial. Id., at 23, n. 8; see Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963).6 In my view, the right 
5
 See United States v. Decoster, 199 U. S. App. D. C. 359, 454-457. 624 
F. 2d 196, 291-294 (en banc) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), cert, denied, 444 
U. S. 944 (1979); Note, 93 Harv. L. Rev., at 767-770. 
6
 In cases in which the government acted in a wav that prevented defense 
counsel from functioning effectively, we have refused to require the de-
fendant, in order to obtain a new trial, to demonstrate that he was injured. 
In Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 75-76 (1942), for example, we 
held: 
"To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by [a defendant] 
as a result of the court's appointment of [the same counsel for two codefen-
dants with conflicting interests] is at once difficult and unnecessary. The 
right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to 
allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice 
arising from its denial." 
As the Court today acknowledges, United States v. Cronic, ante, at 
662, n. 31, whether the government or counsel himself is to blame for the 
inadequacy of the legal assistance received by a defendant should make no 
difference in deciding whether the defendant must prove prejudice. 
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to effective assistance of counsel is entailed by the right to 
counsel, and abridgment of the former is equivalent to 
abridgment of the latter.7 I would thus hold that a show-
ing that the performance of a defendant's lawyer departed 
from constitutionally prescribed standards requires a new 
trial regardless of whether the defendant suffered demon-
strable prejudice thereby. 
II 
Even if I were inclined to join the majority's two central 
holdings, I could not abide the manner in which the majority 
elaborates upon its rulings. Particularly regrettable are the 
majority's discussion of the "presumption" of reasonableness 
to be accorded lawyers' decisions and its attempt to prejudge 
the merits of claims previously rejected by lower courts using 
different legal standards. 
A 
In defining the standard of attorney performance required 
by the Constitution, the majority appropriately notes that 
many problems confronting criminal defense attorneys admit 
of "a range of legitimate" responses. Ante, at 689. And the 
majority properly cautions courts, when reviewing a lawyer's 
selection amongst a set of options, to avoid the hubris of hind-
sight. Ibid. The majority goes on, however, to suggest 
that reviewing courts should "indulge a strong presumption 
that counsel's conduct" was constitutionally acceptable, ibid.; 
see ante, at 690, 696, and should "applfy] a heavy measure of 
deference to counsel's judgments," ante, at 691. 
I am not sure what these phrases mean, and I doubt that 
they will be self-explanatory to lower courts. If they denote 
nothing more than that a defendant claiming he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel has the burden of proof, I 
7
 See United States v. Yelardy, 567 F. 2d 863, 865, n. 1 (CA6), cert. 
denied, 439 U. S. 842 (1978); Beasley v. United States, 491 F. 2d 687, 696 
(CA6 1974); Commonwealth v. Badger, 482 Pa. 240, 243-244, 393 A. 2d 
642, 644 (1978). 
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would agree. See United States v. Cronic, ante, at 658. 
But the adjectives "strong" and "heavy" might be read as 
imposing upon defendants an unusually weighty burden of 
persuasion. If that is the majority's intent, I must respect-
fully dissent. The range of acceptable behavior defined by 
"prevailing professional norms," ante, at 688, seems to me 
sufficiently broad to allow defense counsel the flexibility they 
need in responding to novel problems of trial strategy. To 
afford attorneys more latitude, by "strongly presuming" that 
their behavior will fall within the zone of reasonableness, is 
covertly to legitimate convictions and sentences obtained on 
the basis of incompetent conduct by defense counsel. 
The only justification the majority itself provides for its 
proposed presumption is that undue receptivity to claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel would encourage too many 
defendants to raise such claims and thereby would clog the 
courts with frivolous suits and "dampen the ardor" of defense 
counsel. See ante, at 690. I have more confidence than the 
majority in the ability of state and federal courts expedi-
tiously to dispose of meritless arguments and to ensure that 
responsible, innovative lawyering is not inhibited. In my 
view, little will be gained and much may be lost by instruct-
ing the lower courts to proceed on the assumption that a 
defendant's challenge to his lawyer's performance will be 
insubstantial. 
B 
For many years the lower courts have been debating the 
meaning of "effective" assistance of counsel. Different 
courts have developed different standards. On the issue of 
the level of performance required by the Constitution, some 
courts have adopted the forgiving "farce-and-mockery" 
standard,8 while others have adopted various versions of 
8
 See, e. g., State v. Pacheco, 121 Ariz. 88, 91, 588 P. 2d 830, 833 (1978); 
Hoover v. State, 270 Ark. 978, 980, 606 S. W. 2d 749, 751 (1980); Line v. 
State, 272 Ind. 353, 354-355, 397 N. E. 2d 975, 976 (1979). 
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the "reasonable competence" standard.9 On the issue of 
the level of prejudice necessary to compel a new trial, the 
courts have taken a wide variety of positions, ranging from 
the stringent "outcome-determinative" test,10 to the rule that 
a showing of incompetence on the part of defense counsel 
automatically requires reversal of the conviction regardless 
of the injury to the defendant.11 
The Court today substantially resolves these disputes. 
The majority holds that the Constitution is violated when de-
fense counsel's representation falls below the level expected 
of reasonably competent defense counsel, ante, at 687-691, 
and so affects the trial that there is a "reasonable probability" 
that, absent counsel's error, the outcome would have been 
different, ante, at 691-696. 
Curiously, though, the Court discounts the significance of 
its rulings, suggesting that its choice of standards matters 
little and that few if any cases would have been decided 
differently if the lower courts had always applied the tests 
announced today. See ante, at 696-697. Surely the judges 
in the state and lower federal courts will be surprised to learn 
that the distinctions they have so fiercely debated for many 
years are in fact unimportant. 
The majority's comments on this point seem to be 
prompted principally by a reluctance to acknowledge that to-
day's decision will require a reassessment of many previously 
rejected ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The ma-
jority's unhappiness on this score is understandable, but its 
efforts to mitigate the perceived problem will be ineffectual. 
Nothing the majority says can relieve lower courts that hith-
9
 See, e. g., Trapnell v. United States, 725 F. 2d 149, 155 (CA2 1983); 
Cooper v. Fitzharns, 586 F. 2d 1325,1328-1330 (CA9 1978) (en banc), cert, 
denied, 440 U. S. 974 (1979). 
10
 See, e. g., United States v. Decoster, 199 U. S. App. D. C , at 370, and 
IL 74, 624 F. 2d, at 208, and n. 74 (plurality opinion); Knight v. State, 394 
So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 1981). 
u
 See n. 7, supra. 
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erto have been using standards more tolerant of ineffectual 
advocacy of their obligation to scrutinize all claims, old as 
well as new, under the principles laid down today. 
Ill 
The majority suggests that, "[f ]or purposes of describing 
counsel's duties," a capital sentencing proceeding "need not 
be distinguished from an ordinary trial." Ante, at 687. I 
cannot agree. 
The Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the Constitu-
tion requires stricter adherence to procedural safeguards in a 
capital case than in other cases. 
"[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a 
sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its 
finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 
100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or 
two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is 
a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in 
the determination that death is the appropriate punish-
ment in a specific case." Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U. S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (footnote 
omitted).12 
The performance of defense counsel is a crucial component 
of the system of protections designed to ensure that capital 
punishment is administered with some degree of rationality. 
"Reliability" in the imposition of the death sentence can be 
approximated only if the sentencer is fully informed of "all 
possible relevant information about the individual defendant 
whose fate it must determine." Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 
262, 276 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, 
JJ.). The job of amassing that information and presenting it 
12
 See also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 884-885 (1983); Eddings v 
Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 110-112 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586. 
604 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
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in an organized and persuasive manner to the sentencer is 
entrusted principally to the defendant's lawyer. The im-
portance to the process of counsel's efforts,13 combined with 
the severity and irrevocability of the sanction at stake, re-
quire that the standards for determining what constitutes 
"effective assistance" be applied especially stringently in 
capital sentencing proceedings.14 
It matters little whether strict scrutiny of a claim that 
ineffectiveness of counsel resulted in a death sentence 
is achieved through modification of the Sixth Amendment 
standards or through especially careful application of those 
standards. JUSTICE BRENNAN suggests that the necessary 
adjustment of the level of performance required of counsel in 
capital sentencing proceedings can be effected simply by con-
struing the phrase, "reasonableness under prevailing profes-
sional norms," in a manner that takes into account the nature 
of the impending penalty. Ante, at 704-706. Though I 
would prefer a more specific iteration of counsel's duties in 
this special context,161 can accept that proposal. However, 
when instructing lower courts regarding the probability of 
impact upon the outcome that requires a resentencing, I think 
the Court would do best explicitly to modify the legal stand-
ard itself.16 In my view, a person on death row, whose coun-
sel's performance fell below constitutionally acceptable levels, 
should not be compelled to demonstrate a "reasonable prob-
u
 See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 299, 303 (1983). 
14
 As JUSTICE BRENNAN points out, ante, at 704, an additional reason 
for examining especially carefully a Sixth Amendment challenge when it 
pertains to a capital sentencing proceeding is that the result of finding a 
constitutional violation in that context is less disruptive than a finding 
that counsel was incompetent in the liability phase of a trial. 
14
 See Part I-A, supra. For a sensible effort to formulate guidelines 
for the conduct of defense counsel in capital sentencing proceedings, see 
Goodpaster, supra, at 343-345, 360-362. 
w
 For the purposes of this and the succeeding section, I assume, solely 
for the sake of argument, that some showing of prejudice is necessary to 
state a violation of the Sixth Amendment. But cf. Part I-B, supra. 
STRICKLAND u WASHINGTON 717 
668 MARSHALL, J., dissenting 
ability" that he would have been given a life sentence if his 
lawyer had been competent, see ante, at 694; if the defendant 
can establish a significant chance that the outcome would 
have been different, he surely should be entitled to a redeter-
mination of his fate. Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 
97, 121-122 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).17 
IV 
The views expressed in the preceding section oblige me to 
dissent from the majority's disposition of the case before us.18 
It is undisputed that respondent's trial counsel made virtu-
ally no investigation of the possibility of obtaining testimony 
from respondent's relatives, friends, or former employers 
pertaining to respondent's character or background. Had 
counsel done so, he would have found several persons willing 
and able to testify that, in their experience, respondent was 
a responsible, nonviolent man, devoted to his family, and 
active in the affairs of his church. See App. 338-365. Re-
spondent contends that his lawyer could have and should 
have used that testimony to "humanize" respondent, to coun-
teract the impression conveyed by the trial that he was little 
more than a cold-blooded killer. Had this evidence been 
admitted, respondent argues, his chances of obtaining a life 
sentence would have been significantly better. 
17
 As I read the opinion of the Court, it does not preclude this kind of 
adjustment of the legal standard. The majority defines "reasonable prob-
ability" as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the out-
come." Ante, at 694. In view of the nature of the sanction at issue, and 
the difficulty of determining how a sentencer would have responded if pre-
sented with a different set of facts, it could be argued that a lower estimate 
of the likelihood that the outcome of a capital sentencing proceeding was 
influenced by attorney error is sufficient to Undermine confidence" in that 
outcome than would be true in an ordinary criminal case. 
a
 Adhering to my view that the death penalty is unconstitutional under 
all circumstances, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (MARSHALL, 
J., dissenting), I would vote to vacate respondent's sentence even if he had 
not presented a substantial Sixth Amendment claim. 
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Measured against the standards outlined above, respond-
ent's contentions are substantial. Experienced members of 
the death-penalty bar have long recognized the crucial impor-
tance of adducing evidence at a sentencing proceeding that 
establishes the defendant's social and familial connections. 
See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 299, 
300-303, 334-335 (1983). The State makes a colorable— 
though in my view not compelling—argument that defense 
counsel in this case might have made a reasonable "strategic" 
decision not to present such evidence at the sentencing hear-
ing on the assumption that an unadorned acknowledgment of 
respondent's responsibility for his crimes would be more 
likely to appeal to the trial judge, who was reputed to respect 
persons who accepted responsiblity for their actions.19 But 
however justifiable such a choice might have been after coun-
sel had fairly assessed the potential strength of the mitigat-
ing evidence available to him, counsel's failure to make any 
significant effort to find out what evidence might be garnered 
from respondent's relatives and acquaintances surely cannot 
be described as "reasonable." Counsel's failure to investi-
gate is particularly suspicious in light of his candid admission 
that respondent's confessions and conduct in the course of 
the trial gave him a feeling of "hopelessness" regarding the 
possibility of saving respondent's life, see App. 383-384, 
400-401. 
19
 Two considerations undercut the State's explanation of counsel's deci-
sion. First, it is not apparent why adducement of evidence pertaining to 
respondent's character and familial connections would have been inconsist-
ent with respondent's acknowledgment that he was responsible for his be-
havior. Second, the Florida Supreme Court possesses—and frequently 
exercises—the power to overturn death sentences it deems unwarranted 
by the facts of a case. See State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (1973). Even 
if counsel's decision not to try to humanize respondent for the benefit of the 
trial judge were deemed reasonable, counsel's failure to create a record for 
the benefit of the State Supreme Court might well be deemed unreasonable. 
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That the aggravating circumstances implicated by re-
spondent's criminal conduct were substantial, see ante, at 
700, does not vitiate respondent's constitutional claim; judges 
and juries in cases involving behavior at least as egregious 
have shown mercy, particularly when afforded an oppor-
tunity to see other facets of the defendant's personality 
and life.20 Nor is respondent's contention defeated by the 
possibility that the material his counsel turned up might 
not have been sufficient to establish a statutory mitigating 
circumstance under Florida law; Florida sentencing judges 
and the Florida Supreme Court sometimes refuse to impose 
death sentences in cases "in which, even though statutory 
mitigating circumstances do not outweigh statutory aggra-
vating circumstances, the addition of nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances tips the scales in favor of life imprisonment." 
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 964 (1983) (STEVENS, J.. 
concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original). 
If counsel had investigated the availability of mitigating 
evidence, he might well have decided to present some such 
material at the hearing. If he had done so, there is a sig-
nificant chance that respondent would have been given a life 
sentence. In my view, those possibilities, conjoined with 
the unreasonableness of counsel's failure to investigate, are 
more than sufficient to establish a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment and to entitle respondent to a new sentencing 
proceeding. 
I respectfully dissent. 
"See, e. g., Farmer & Kinard, The Trial of the Penalty Phase (1976). 
reprinted in 2 California State Public Defender, California Death Penalty 
Manual N-33, N-45 (1980). 
